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a b s t r a c t
Traceable signatures (TS), suggested by Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung (Eurocrypt’04), extend
group signatures to address various basic traceability issues beyondmerely identifying the
anonymous signer of a rogue signature. Namely, they enable the efficient tracing of all
signatures produced by a misbehaving party without opening the identity of other parties.
They also allow users to provably claim ownership of a previously signed anonymous
signature. To date, known TS systems all rely on the random oracle model. In this work
we present the first realization of the primitive that avoids resorting to the random oracle
methodology in its security proofs. Furthermore, our realization’s efficiency is comparable
to that of the latest fastest and shortest standard model group signatures.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Group Signatures Background. Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [22], allow members of a group
to sign messages without revealing their identity. When the necessity arises, an authority holding some privileged piece of
information can ‘‘open’’ signatures and uncover the signer’s identity. Such primitives find applications in electronic auctions
or trusted computing platforms where anonymity is a central issue.
The first scalable coalition-resistant system was proposed by Ateniese et al. [4]. Recent years have seen a continued
interest in the primitive with the appearance of pairing-based constructions (e.g. [15,43]). In general, when it comes to
signatures, pairing has been employed to achieve two goals: (1) short signatures and (2) realizations in the standard model,
not relying on the random oracle idealization. Notably, Boneh et al. [15] showed the first scheme featuring signatures
shorter than 200 bytes. Its security was analyzed in (a relaxation of) the model of Bellare et al. (BMW) [7], which captures
the requirements of group signatures in three properties but assumes static groups. The setting of dynamic groups was
formalized by Bellare–Shi–Zhang (BSZ) [9] and, independently, by Kiayias–Yung [39] while efficient systems were given
in [39,43,29,26].
The aforementioned practical proposals all rely on the random oracle model [8]. In the standard model, the theoretical
constructions of [7,9] were ‘‘only’’ proofs of concept (plausibility results), since the main interest is in getting efficient
schemes. Using improved non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) techniques [35,34] inspired by an earlier homomorphic
encryption scheme [16], Boyen and Waters [19] showed a fairly efficient realization with logarithmic-size signatures in
the static BMW model. They subsequently improved [20] it to get rid of the dependency of signatures’ size on the group
cardinality. Ateniese et al. [3] independently constructed another scheme relying on stronger interactive assumptions.
Meanwhile, Groth [32] came up with constant-size signatures without random oracles in the (dynamic) BSZ model, but
signatures remained too long for practical use. In 2007, Groth showed [33] another standard model scheme with signatures
shorter than 2 kB and full anonymity in the BSZ model.
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Traceable Signatures. In group signatures, if we are given amember’s name and his public key, scanning all signatures and
verifying which ones were signed by that member is only doable by revoking the anonymity of all signatures (in particular,
signatures of honest users). To overcome this, and allow further tracing properties, Kiayias et al. [38] introduced traceable
signatures (TS). They still allow the group manager (GM) to open signatures individually. In addition, however, the GM can
reveal a trapdoor allowing clerks to trace suspicious members’ signatures without having to revoke anonymity of every
single signature. Misbehaving users can thus be traced without affecting the anonymity of honest ones. Moreover, such
a traceability results in increased scalability, since tracing agents can run in parallel whereas traditional group signatures
involve a centralized tracing authority.1 Traceable signatures also support a mechanism enabling users to claim (and prove)
the authorship of their own anonymously generated signatures.
Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung (KTY) formalized the security of traceable signatures via three properties termed
misidentification security, non-frameability and anonymity. They suggested a first implementation of the primitive (using
the Fiat–Shamir heuristic [28] and thus the random oracle model) and proved its security under the Strong RSA and the
Decision Diffie–Hellman assumptions. Later on, efficiency improvements were suggested by Ge and Tate [30]. Meanwhile,
Nguyen and Safavi-Naini [43] and Choi et al. [23] gave pairing-based constructions with shorter signatures. More recently,
Benjumea et al. [10] considered traceable signatureswith extended capabilities in themulti-group setting and implemented
them in the random oracle model.
Our Contribution. Constructions with security proofs in the random oracle model are known to sometimes have
realizability problems [21]. In this paper we construct the first efficient traceable signature in the standard model, where
we employ the Groth–Sahai [36] non-interactivewitness indistinguishable (NIWI) proof systems as part of the construction.
We prove it secure in the KTY sense under non-interactive (and thus falsifiable) assumptions.
As far as efficiency goes, our scheme is on par with most efficient standard model group signatures: for recommended
parameters, we obtain signatures of less than 2.6 kB, which is close to the size of Groth’s signatures [33], while both schemes
have similar computational complexities for signing and verification. From a security standpoint, the two constructions rely
on intractability assumptions of comparable strengths. Whereas Groth’s system is proved anonymous in the strong sense
(i.e., where the adversary has access to an oracle that ‘‘removes’’ the anonymity of adversarially-chosen signatures), our
basic scheme is anonymous in a weaker sense but readily extends – by applying the same twist as in [33] – to achieve the
same anonymity level at a quite moderate additional cost: in this case, the signature size does not exceed 3 kB.
Our traceable signature systemalso allows users to non-interactively claim their own signatures in an abuse-freemanner.
In previous TS realizations, claims consist in zero-knowledge proofs that can bemade non-interactive using the Fiat–Shamir
transformation. In our setting, implementing claims using the Groth–Sahai techniques requires special care to make sure
that dishonest group members will not be able to copy each other’s claims. As a contribution of independent interest (and
a novelty w.r.t. the proceedings version of this paper [40]), we thus extend the original model of traceable signatures [38]
in order to explicitly capture that honest users’ claims cannot be copied by dishonest users. We then give a convenient way
for signers to claim their signatures and non-malleably link their claims to a long-term public key which they previously
registered in a PKI.
Related work. Independently and concurrently, Chow [24] considered an extension of traceable signatures where a tracing
trapdoor enables the reconstruction of a set of tags, each one of which identifies a signature from the traced user. Instead of
collecting and scanning all signatures using the tracing trapdoor, the tracing agent recomputes signature-specific tags,which
are sent to signature holders who have to compare them with deterministically-generated tags included in each signature.
This new kind of TS scheme was analyzed in both the random oracle model and in the standard model. While the
construction of [24] yields a more efficient tracing mechanism, it only provides a weaker flavor of anonymity where the
anonymity adversary is limited to observe a fixed number of signatures from each honest user. In addition, [24] does not
consider how to keep non-interactive claims from being copied, as we do.
Organization. In the following, Section 2 first describes themodel of the TS primitive and the various tools and assumptions
that we use. The scheme is described in Section 3 and its security results are proved in Section 4.
2. Background
Throughout the paper, when S is a set, x $← S denotes the action of choosing x uniformly at random in S. By a ∈ poly(λ),
we mean that a is a polynomial in λwhile b ∈ negl(λ) says that b is a negligible function of λ (i.e., a function that decreases
faster than the inverse of any a ∈ poly(λ)). When a and b are binary strings, a||b stands for their concatenation.
2.1. Complexity assumptions
We use groups (G,GT ) of prime order p and endowed with an efficiently computable map e : G × G → GT such that
e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab for any elements (g, h) ∈ G× G, a, b ∈ Z and e(g, h) ≠ 1GT whenever g, h ≠ 1G.
1 Group signatures with verifier-local revocation [17] are an exception, as verification entails publicly running some implicit tracingmechanism tomake
sure that the signer is not revoked.
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In this algebraic setting, we rely on hardness assumptions that are all non-interactive and thus falsifiable [42]. The first
one, introduced by Boneh et al. [15], allows constructing NIWI proofs as noted in [36].
Definition 1. In a group G = ⟨g⟩ of prime order p > 2λ, the Decision Linear Problem (DLIN) is to distinguish
the distributions (ga, gb, gac, gbd, gc+d) and (ga, gb, gac, gbd, gz), with a, b, c, d $← Z∗p , z $← Z∗p . The Decision Linear
Assumption asserts that, for any PPT distinguisherD ,
AdvDLING,D (λ) = |Pr[D(ga, gb, gac, gbd, gc+d) = 1|a, b, c, d $← Z∗p]
− Pr[D(ga, gb, gac, gbd, gz) = 1|a, b, c, d $← Z∗p, z $← Z∗p]| ∈ negl(λ).
This problem amounts to deciding whether vectors g⃗1 = (ga, 1, g), g⃗2 = (1, gb, g) and g⃗3 are linearly dependent.
We also use a variant, introduced by Boyen and Waters [20], of the Strong Diffie–Hellman assumption [13].
Definition 2 ([20]). In a group G of prime order p, the ℓ-Hidden Strong Diffie–Hellman problem (ℓ-HSDH) is, given
elements (g,Ω = gω, u) $← G3 and ℓ triples (g1/ω+si , g si , usi) with s1, . . . , sℓ ∈ Z∗p , to find another triple (g1/ω+s, g s, us)
such that s ≠ si for i = 1, . . . , ℓ.
We finally need a variant of the problem, called Triple Diffie–Hellman, recently considered by Belenkiy et al. [6].
Definition 3. Let G be a group of prime order p. The (modified) ℓ-Triple Diffie–Hellman Problem (ℓ-mTDH) is, given
(g, ga, gb) ∈ G3, for randomly chosen a, b $← Z∗p , and ℓ distinct pairs (g1/(a+ci), ci) with c1, . . . , cℓ ∈ Z∗p , to output a triple
(gµ, gbµ, gabµ) for some non-zero µ ∈ Z∗p .
The original Triple Diffie–Hellman problem [6] was to find a triple (gaµ, gbµ, gabµ) given the same inputs. In the paper, we
only need these inputs to comprise a single pair (c, g1/(a+c)) (i.e., ℓ = 1). A related assumption, named BB-CDH [5], asserts
the infeasibility of finding gab on input of (ga, gb) as well as pairs (g1/(a+ci), ci) with c1, . . . , cℓ ∈ Z∗p . Under the knowledge
of exponent assumption (KEA)2 [25], the ℓ-mTDH problem is equivalent to the BB-CDH problem. The hardness of ℓ-mTDH
in generic groups is thus implied by the generic intractability of KEA [27,1] and BB-CDH.
2.2. Model and security notions
As in [9,39], we assume a PKI and require each user i to hold a private/public key pair (usk[i], upk[i]) for an ordinary
signature scheme. The public key upk[i]must be properly certified before the user registers as a group member.
A traceable signature [38] consists of the following algorithms or protocols.
Setup: given a security parameter λ ∈ N, this algorithm (possibly run by a trusted party) generates a group public key Y,
that is widely distributed, and the matching private key S which is handed to the group manager.
Join(GM,Ui): is an interactive protocol, between the group manager GM and the prospective user Ui, whereby the latter
obtains a membership secret seci, that nobody else knows, and a membership certificate certi. The GM stores the
whole transcript in a database called transcripts, which is a private database also containing the coin tosses that
were used by the GM.
Sign: given a certificatemembership certi, a membership secret seci and amessageM , this algorithm outputs a traceable
signature σ ofM .
Verify: on input of a signature σ , a messageM and a group public key Y, this deterministic algorithm returns 0 or 1.
Open: takes as input a signature σ that verifies under the group public key Y, the corresponding private key S and the
database transcripts of all transcripts of join protocols. It outputs the identity i of a group member.
Reveal: takes in the groupmanager’s private key S, the index i of a groupmember and the join transcript transcripti of user
i. It outputs the latter’s tracing trapdoor tracei.
Trace: on input of a valid traceable signature σ , the group public key Y and a tracing trapdoor tracei for user i, this
algorithm outputs either 0 or 1.
Claim: takes as input the group public key Y, a valid message-signature pair (M, σ ) issued by user i, the latter’s
membership secret seci and certificate certi as well as his private key usk[i]. The output is an authorship claim
τ of user i for σ .
Claim-Verify: given a group public keyY, a message-signature pair (M, σ ), a claim τ and the public key upk[i] of user i, this
deterministic algorithm outputs 0 or 1.
Security properties are formalized by experimentswhere the adversary is granted access to oracles sharing certain variables:
- state: contains the join transcripts, membership certificates and secrets that have been defined so far.
- N is the number of users in the group.
2 This assumption states that, given g, ga ∈ G, the only way to generate a pair (h, ha) ∈ G2 is to raise g and ga to some power and thus know x = logg (h).
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- Sigs: is the database of signatures issued by the Qsig oracle.
- Claims: is the database of signatures that were issued by the Qsig oracle and subsequently claimed by the signer.
- Revs: is the set of members that have been the input of a Qreveal query.
- Up: is the set of honest users introduced in the system via a Qp-join query.
- Ua: is the set of adversarially-controlled users in the system.
- Ub: is the set of users that were introduced by the adversary acting as a dishonest group manager. For such users, the
transcript of the join protocol is leaked to the adversary.
For reasons that will become apparent in security definitions (more precisely, when defining security against framing
attacks), we will consider an equivalence class for message-signature pairs. The model of non-frameability considered in
[39,23] implicitly captures a flavor of strong unforgeability [2] in that it can only be satisfied when adversaries are unable
to randomize existing signatures and turn them into other signatures on the same message. Here, due to the use of NIWI
proof systems where non-interactive proofs are publicly re-randomizable, we will need to consider a slightly relaxed flavor
of non-frameability. To this end, we define an equivalence relation over the signature space. In our scheme, each signature
will consist of a number of traceability values, several commitments and a set of proofs elements. We say that twomessage-
signature pairs (M1, σ1), (M2, σ2) belong to the same equivalence class, which we denote by (M1, σ1) ≡s (M2, σ2), if they
pertain to the same message (i.e.,M1 = M2) and they comprise identical traceability values.
The various oracles that adversaries are given access to are listed below.
- QY: returns the public information (N,Y) of the system.
- QS: returns the group manager’s private key and thereby allows the adversary to corrupt the latter.
- Qp-join: is an oracle that privately introduces new honest users in the group. It simulates the join protocol in
private, adds index N into Up, increases N by 1 and finally updates variables state and transcripts as state ←
state||(N, transcriptN, certN, secN) and transcripts← transcripts||(N, transcriptN).
- Qa-join: allows the adversary to introduce users under his control in the group. The oracle, acting as the group manager,
interacts with the malicious prospective user in the join protocol. If the protocol successfully terminates, the oracle
increments N and finally sets state ← state||(N, transcriptN, certN,⊥), transcripts ← transcripts||(N, transcriptN) and
adds N into Ua.
- Qb-join: allows the adversary, acting as a dishonest groupmanager, to introduce new groupmembers. The oracle, acting on
behalf of the prospective user, interacts with the malicious group manager in the join protocol. If the latter successfully
terminates, the oracle increases N by 1, sets state← state||(N, transcriptN, certN,⊥), and adds N into Ub.
- Qsig: on input of a messageM and a user index i, the oracle checks if state contains an entry of the form (i, ·, certi, seci).
If no such record is found or if i ∈ Ua, it returns⊥. Otherwise, it generates and returns a traceable signature on behalf of
user i using certi and seci. It also sets Sigs← Sigs||(i,M, σ ).
- QClaim: on input of a triple (i,M, σ ), this oracle first checks whether i belongs to the set of good users (which is either
Up or Ub depending on the considered security notion) and whether a triple (i,M ′, σ ′) such that (M ′, σ ′) ≡v (M, σ )
appears in Sigs. If either of these conditions fails to hold (i.e., if user i is not an honest user or did not generate (M, σ )), it
returns ⊥ and sets Claims ← Claims||(i,M, σ ). Otherwise, it outputs a non-interactive authorship claim τ for the pair
(M, σ ) on behalf of user i and also sets Claims← Claims||(i,M, σ ).
- Qreveal: on input of a user index i, this oracle returns⊥ if user i does not exist or if i ∈ Ub. Otherwise, it returns the output
of Reveal(i, transcripts) and adds i to Revs.
Misidentification attacks. In a misidentification attack, the adversary is allowed to control a number of group members,
which are introduced by invoking the Qa-join oracle. Through the Qp-join and Qsig oracles, he can observe operations while
users are added and generate signatures. He is also given access to users’ tracing information via the Qreveal oracle. His goal
is to produce a non-trivial valid signature that does not open to any of the users under his control or that cannot be traced
back to one of them.
Definition 4. A traceable signature is secure against misidentification attacks if, for any PPT adversary A, it holds that
Advmis-idA (λ) = Pr[Exptmis-idA (λ) = 1] ∈ negl(λ) in the experiment below.
Experiment Exptmis-idA (λ)
1. (Y, S)← Setup(λ);
2. (M⋆, σ ⋆)← A(QY,Qp-join,Qa-join,Qsig,Qreveal);
3. If Verify(M⋆, σ ⋆,Y) = 0 then return 0;
4. If

(Open(σ ⋆,Y, S) ∉ Ua) ∨ (i∈Ua Trace(σ ⋆,Reveal(i)) = 0)∧ i∈Up(i,M⋆, ∗) ∉ Sigs then return 1;
5. Return 0;
Framing attacks. In a framing attack, the adversary can corrupt the group manager (via the QS oracle) and observe the
system while users are added and produce signatures. Two kinds of framing attacks are considered. First, the adversary is
deemed successful if he manages to produce a signature that opens or traces to an innocent group member. Second, he
also wins if he can either (1) forge an honest signer’s claim w.r.t. that signer’s long term public key; (2) successfully claim a
signature produced (and possibly claimed) by another user as his own using his own long term public key.
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Definition 5. A traceable signature is secure against framing attacks if, for any PPT adversaryA involved in the experiment
hereafter, AdvfraA (λ) = Pr[ExptfraA (λ) = 1] is negligible.
Experiment ExptfraA (λ)
1. (Y, S)← Setup(λ);
2. (M⋆, σ ⋆, τ ⋆, upk⋆)← A(QY,QS,Qb-join,Qsig);
3. If Verify(M⋆, σ ⋆,Y) = 0 then return 0;
4. If

(Open(σ ⋆,Y, S) = i ∈ Ub) ∨ (∃i ∈ Ub s.t. Trace(σ ⋆,Reveal(i)) = 1)
∧ ̸ ∃(i,M, σ ) ∈ Sigs s.t. (M⋆, σ ⋆) ≡s (M, σ ) then return 1;
5. If
∃i ∈ Ub s.t. (i,M, σ ) ∈ Sigs ∧ (M⋆, σ ⋆) ≡s (M, σ )
∧ ̸ ∃(j,M, σ ) ∈ Claims s.t. (j = i) ∧ (M⋆, σ ⋆) ≡s (M, σ )
∧ Claim-Verify(M⋆, σ ⋆, τ ⋆, upk[i],Y) = 1 ∧ upk⋆ = upk[i] then return 1;
6. If
∃i ∈ Ub s.t. (i,M, σ ) ∈ Sigs ∧ (M⋆, σ ⋆) ≡s (M, σ )
∧ Claim-Verify(M⋆, σ ⋆, τ ⋆, upk⋆,Y) = 1 ∧ upk⋆ ≠ upk[i] then return 1;
7. Return 0;
In the above experiment, condition 5 captures the infeasibility of claiming signatures without knowing the appropriate
key material. Condition 6 deals with the situation of the adversary illegally claiming the authorship of some honest group
member’s signature regardless of whether that member has already claimed his signature or not. This notably implies that
no two members should be able to successfully claim the same signature.
Anonymity. An anonymity adversary runs in two stages called play and guess. In the first one, the adversary is allowed to
join the system via Qa-join-queries on polynomially-many occasions. Using the Qp-join, Qsig oracles, he can observe the system
while users are privately introduced and signmessages. He can finally obtain tracing trapdoors for users of his choice. At the
end of the play stage, he chooses two privately introduced users i⋆0, i
⋆
1 that were not the input of a Qreveal-query and obtains
a signature on behalf of one of them. In the guess stage, he aims at finding out who the signer was among i⋆0 and i
⋆
1.
In comparison with the definition of anonymity in [38], we introduce a claiming oracle Qclaim and enable the adversary
to request claims for honestly generated signatures. Of course, the adversary is not allowed to obtain claims on behalf of i⋆0
and i⋆1 for signatures that belong to the same equivalence class as the challenge pair (M
⋆, σ ⋆).
Definition 6. A traceable signature scheme provides anonymity if, for any PPT adversaryA in the experiment hereafter, we
have Advanon(A) := |Pr[ExptanonA (λ) = 1] − 1/2| ∈ negl(λ).
Experiment ExptanonA (λ)
1. (Y, S)← Setup(λ);
2. (aux,M⋆, i⋆0, i
⋆
1)← A(play : QY,Qp-join,Qa-join,Qsig,Qreveal,Qclaim);
3. If (i⋆0 ∉ Up) ∨ (i⋆1 ∉ Up) ∨ (i⋆0 ∈ Revs) ∨ (i⋆1 ∈ Revs) then return 0;
4. d⋆ $← {0, 1}; σ ⋆ ← Sign(M⋆,Y, certi⋆d⋆ , seci⋆d⋆ );
5. d′ ← A(guess, σ ⋆, aux : QY,Qp-join,Qa-join,Qsig,Qreveal,Qclaim);
6. If

(i⋆0 ∈ Revs) ∨ (i⋆1 ∈ Revs)

∨ ∃(j,M, σ ) ∈ Claims s.t. j ∈ {i⋆0, i⋆1} ∧ (M, σ ) ≡s (M⋆, σ ⋆) then return 0;
7. If d′ = d⋆ then return 1;
8. Return 0;
The KTY model does not provide adversaries with an opening oracle in the definition of anonymity. On the other hand,
since tracing is a distributed operation, the model considers (via the Qreveal oracle) the threat of corrupted tracing agents. In
the following, we will stick to that model. In applications where anonymity should be preserved when opening queries are
allowed, it is not hard to modify our scheme (using the technique of [33]) to obtain anonymity in the CCA2 sense.
2.3. Groth–Sahai commitments
In the following, for equal-dimension vectors or matrices A and B containing group elements, A ⊙ B stands for their
component-wise product.
When based on the DLIN assumption, the Groth–Sahai proof systems [36] make use of a common reference string
comprising vectors g⃗1, g⃗2, g⃗3 ∈ G3 where, for some group elements g1, g2 ∈ G, g⃗1 = (g1, 1, g), g⃗2 = (1, g2, g). To commit
to a group element X ∈ G, one picks r, s, t $← Z∗p and computes C⃗ = (1, 1, X)⊙ g⃗1r ⊙ g⃗2s ⊙ g⃗3t . When the proof system is
chosen to provide perfectly sound proofs, g⃗3 is chosen as g⃗3 = g⃗1ξ1 ⊙ g⃗2ξ2 with ξ1, ξ2 $← Z∗p . Commitments are then Boneh–
Boyen–Shacham (BBS) encryptions since C⃗ = (g r+ξ1t1 , g s+ξ2t2 , X ·g r+s+t(ξ1+ξ2)) anddecryption is possible usingα1 = logg(g1),
α2 = logg(g2). In theWI setting, g⃗1, g⃗2, g⃗3 are linearly independent and C⃗ is a perfectly hiding commitment. Under the DLIN
assumption, the two reference strings are indistinguishable.
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To commit to exponents x ∈ Zp, one uses vectors ϕ⃗, g⃗1, g⃗2 and computes C⃗ = ϕ⃗x ⊙ g⃗1r ⊙ g⃗2s. In the soundness setting
ϕ⃗, g⃗1, g⃗2 are linearly independent vectors whereas, in the WI setting, choosing ϕ⃗ = g⃗1ξ1 ⊙ g⃗2ξ2 always gives a perfectly
hiding commitment given that C⃗ is a BBS encryption of 1G regardless of the value x.
To provide evidence that committed variables satisfy a set of relations, the proof systems of [36] start from the relations
themselves and replace variables by commitments. The prover then generates a proof (consisting of a set of group elements)
for each relation. The whole proof consists of one commitment per variable and one proof for each relation. Such efficient
non-interactive proofs are available for pairing-product relations, which are of the type
n∏
i=1
e(Ai,Xi) ·
n∏
i=1
·
n∏
j=1
e(Xi,Xj)aij = tT ,
for variables X1, . . . ,Xn ∈ G and constants tT ∈ GT , A1, . . . ,An ∈ G, aij ∈ G, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Efficient proofs also
exist for multi-exponentiation equations
m∏
i=1
A
yi
i ·
n∏
j=1
X
bj
j ·
m∏
i=1
·
n∏
j=1
X
yiγij
j = T ,
for variables X1, . . . ,Xn ∈ G, y1, . . . , ym ∈ Zp and constants T ,A1, . . . ,Am ∈ G, b1, . . . , bn ∈ Zp and γij ∈ G, for
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Multi-exponentiation equations admit zero-knowledge proofs at no additional cost. On a simulated CRS (prepared for the
WI setting), a trapdoormakes it is possible to simulate proofs without knowingwitnesses and simulated proofs are perfectly
indistinguishable from real proofs. As for pairing-product equations, zero-knowledge proofs are often possible but usually
come at the expense of some overhead in comparison with NIWI proofs for the same equations: typically, the size of proofs
may depend on the number of variables. In the paper, we only utilize NIZK proofs for multi-exponentiation equations.
In both cases, proofs for quadratic equations cost 9 group elements. Linear pairing-product equations (when aij = 0 for
all i, j) take 3 group elements each. Linear multi-exponentiation equations of the type
∏n
j=1X
bj
j = T (resp.
∏m
i=1A
yi
i = T )
demand 3 (resp. 2) group elements.
3. Construction
Intuition. The group manager has a public key comprising elements (Ω = gω, h0, h1, h2) and uses ω ∈ Z∗p to generate
membership certificates. These consist of 5 elements (K1, K2, K3, K4, y) and are reminiscent of users’ private keys in the
Boyen–Waters group signature [20]. Namely, K1 is derived as K1 = (h0 · hx1 · hy2)1/(ω+sID), where sID is chosen by GM and
identifies the userU while x is only known toU as his membership secret. The last element y is chosen by GM as part the
tracing trapdoor forU. The certificate also contains K3 = g sID and K4 = usID0 as in [20]. Security proofs also require to include
K2 = g1/(ω+sID) (so that, as in [18], ω and sID simultaneously appear more than once as denominators in the exponent).
To enable traceability when the appropriate tracing trapdoor is revealed (which is sometimes called ‘‘implicit tracing’’,
as opposed to the ‘‘explicit tracing’’ that appeals to the signature opening algorithm), each signature must contain certain
‘‘traceability values’’ that make it possible to link the signature to its issuer. One of the technical points to address is to get
these traceability values to interact with Groth–Sahai proof systems in a simple way. Indeed, at some step of the proof of
anonymity, knowledge of the underlying valueswill have to be simulated in a zero-knowledgemanner (i.e., without knowing
the actual witnesses). Previously used approaches to achieve implicit tracing using pairings (e.g., [23]) would require the
traceability components to satisfy some pairing-product equation [36], for which zero-knowledge proofs usually come at
some additional costwhen they are at all possible. For this reason, as such traceability values, we rather let the signer include
pieces of a linear tuple (T1, T2, T3) = (gxδ1 , gyδ2 , gδ1+δ2) – which is a set of multi-exponentiation equations in the Groth–
Sahai terminology – in each signature in such away that the tracing trapdoor (X = gx, y) allows testing whether a signature
stems from userU by checking if e(T1, g) = e(X, T3/T 1/y2 ). Thanks to the use of multi-exponentiation equations, knowledge
of the underlying scalars δ1, δ2 will be simulatable (in the WI setting) in a simple way in the proof of anonymity, which
eventually relies on the sole DLIN assumption.
In traceability concerns, attentionmust be paid to the fact that usersmay be tempted to alter theirmembership certificate
and modify the corresponding values x, y so as to defeat (implicit or explicit) tracing attempts. In the random oracle model,
the problem is usually much easier in non-frameable pairing-based group signatures [43,29,26,23], where membership
certificates also have one component of the form K1 = (h0 · hx1 · hy2)1/(ω+sID). In those schemes, signatures prove knowledge
of values (K1, x, y, sID) that satisfy the latter relation and, in the security proof, the forking lemma [44] allows extracting
them in order to break some number theoretic assumption. In the present context, the problem is that committed exponents
x, y, sID ∈ Zp are not fully extractable from Groth–Sahai commitments (typically, only gx, gy, g sID are extractable) and we
must settle for extracting non-trivial information on themwhen it comes to prove traceability. To this end, we require each
signature to contain redundancies in the form of (commitments to) quantities hx1 · hy2 and hx3 · hy4, for some group elements
h3 and h4, which render certificate randomizations infeasible (as established by the proof against Type III forgeries in the
security analysis against misidentification attacks). We remark that, in [33], Groth used a different method to build a non-
frameable group signature using a certified signature scheme [12]. However, we cannot use the same technique since the
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underlying certified signature only allows signing single group elements whereas we need to bind both X ∈ G and y ∈ Zp
to the membership certificate.
In [20], group members sign messages m ∈ {0, 1}n by randomly choosing r $← Zp and computing pairs (θ1, θ2) =
(usID0 · Gv(m)r , g r) using Waters’ technique [45] and a number theoretic hash function Gv : {0, 1}n → G (termed
‘‘programmable’’ by Hofheinz and Kiltz [37]). In non-frameability concerns, we force signers to also use their membership
secret x and generate pairs (θ1, θ2), somewhat in the fashion of theWaters-basedmulti-signature of Lu et al. [41]. Instead of
signing amessagem as (θ1, θ2) = (usID0 ·ux1 ·Gv(m)r , g r), we need to generate such pairs as (θ1, θ2) = (usID0 ·uxδ11 ·Gv(m)r , g r)
for the proof of non-frameability to work. Of course, u1 and the set of group elements that implement the number theoretic
hash function Gv(.) are assumed to come from a trusted key generation procedure. In particular, the discrete logarithm
logg(u1)must be held back from the group manager as, otherwise, a dishonest GM could frame honest users.
Signers claim their signatures by proving knowledge of exponents x, y ∈ Zp such that T3 = T 1/x1 · T 1/y2 . These proofs are
also non-interactive andmake use of a secondWaters-like hash functionGf : {0, 1}n → G, the parameters (f0, f1, . . . , fn) ∈R
Gn+1 of which must be generated by a trusted party (and not by the group manager as the latter could claim honest
users’ signatures if it were allowed to generate this reference string itself) when the scheme is set up. One difficulty is
to prevent possibly dishonest group members from copying each other’s claims. To this end, non-interactive claims are
non-malleably bound to the long-term public key of the group member (as will be discussed hereafter, non-repudiation is
enforced by having users register a public key upk in a PKI and use the private key usk to sign a piece of their membership
certificate). In order to claim a signature containing traceability values (T1, T2, T3) = (gxδ1 , gyδ2 , gδ1+δ2) using their
secret information x, y ∈ Zp, signers first compute a n-bit string mc = H(M||T1||T2||T3||upk) and generate two pairs
(Dx,1,Dx,2) = (f 1/x · Gf (mc)rx , T rx1 ) and (Dy,1,Dy,2) = (f 1/y · Gf (mc)ry , T ry1 ) using random rx, ry $← Zp. Elements
(Dx,1,Dx,2,Dy,1,Dy,2) are in turn signed using the long-term private key usk associated with upk.
In order to ensure non-repudiation, users have to register a long term public key upk in some PKI. In non-repudiation
concerns, the underlying private key usk is used to sign (using an ordinary signature scheme) parts (X, K1, K2, K3, y) of their
membership certificate during the join protocol.
Description. In notations hereafter, it will be convenient to define the coordinate-wise pairing E : G×G3 → G3T such that,
for any element h ∈ G and any vector g⃗ = (g1, g2, g3), we have E

h, g⃗
 = e(h, g1), e(h, g2), e(h, g3). In addition, we shall
also make use of a symmetric bilinear mapping F : G3×G3 → G9T such that, for any two vectors X⃗ = (X1, X2, X3) ∈ G3 and
Y⃗ = (Y1, Y2, Y3) ∈ G3, F(X⃗, Y⃗ ) = F˜(X⃗, Y⃗ )1/2 · F˜(Y⃗ , X⃗)1/2, where the non-commutative mapping F˜ : G3 × G3 → G9T sends
(X⃗, Y⃗ ) onto the matrix F˜(X⃗, Y⃗ ) of entry-wise pairings (i.e., containing e(Xi, Yj) in its entry (i, j)).
Also, for any z ∈ GT , ιT (z) denotes the 3× 3 matrix containing z in position (3, 3) and 1GT everywhere else. For X ∈ G,
the notation ι(X)will sometimes denote the vector (1, 1, X) ∈ G3.
Setup(λ, n): given security parameters λ and n ∈ poly(λ), choose bilinear groups (G,GT ) of order p > 2λ, with g, h0, h2,
h3, h4, u0, u1
$← G. Select γ1, ω $← Z∗p and set h1 = gγ1 , Ω = gω . Select v = (v0, v1, . . . , vn) $← Gn+1. Choose
vectors g = (g⃗1, g⃗2, g⃗3) such that g⃗1 = (g1, 1, g) ∈ G3, g⃗2 = (1, g2, g) ∈ G3, and g⃗3 = g⃗1ξ1 ⊙ g⃗2ξ2 , with g1 = gα1 ,
g2 = gα2 and α1, α2 $← Z∗p , ξ1, ξ2 $← Zp. It also chooses f = (f0, f1, . . . , fn) $← Gn+1 and f $← G. The algorithm
also specifies a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n from a collision-resistant family. The group public key is
defined to be
Y :=

g, h0, h1 = gγ1 , h2, h3, h4, Ω = gω, u0, u1, v, f , g, H

while the private key S := γ1, ω, α1, α2 is given to the group manager.
Join(GM,Ui): the prospective group member Ui and the group manager GM run an interactive protocol whereby the user
obtains a membership certificate certi and a membership secret seci. The protocol is the following:
1. User Ui and the GM execute an interactive protocol (such as Groth’s protocol [33, Section 4.1] recalled in
Appendix B) allowing them to jointly generate X = gx so that x ∈ Zp is randomly distributed and known
only to the user while GM learns the corresponding public value X .
2. GM first computes hx1 = Xγ1 and then uses it to compute K1 = (h0 · hx1 · hy2)1/(ω+sID), K2 = g1/(ω+sID), K3 = g sID
and K4 = usID0 , for newly chosen random values sID, y $← Z∗p . Elements K1, K2, K3 and y are sent to the user.
3. Ui checks that received elements (K1, K2, K3, y) satisfy
e(K1,Ω · K3) = e(h0, g) · e(h1, X) · e(h2, g)y,
e(K2,Ω · K3) = e(g, g).
If so, he generates a signature sigi = Signusk[i]

X ||K1||K2||K3||gy

and sends it back to GM.
4. If Verifyupk[i]

X ||K1||K2||K3||gy, sigi
 = 1, the group manager GM sends K4 = usID0 toUi and stores the record
transcripti := (X, K1, K2, K3, K4, y, sigi) in its database transcripts. UserUi checks that e(K3, u0) = e(g, K4). If
so, he sets his membership certificate as certi := (K1, K2, K3, K4, y) and his membership secret as seci := x.
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Sign(M,Y, certi, seci): to sign M , userUi parses certi as (K1, K2, K3, K4, y) and seci as x ∈ Z∗p and conducts the following
steps.
1. Choose δ1, δ2
$← Z∗p and compute the traceability values
T1 = gxδ1 T2 = gyδ2 T3 = gδ1+δ2 .
2. Set Gv(m) = v0 ·∏nj=1 vmjj withm = m1 . . .mn = H(M||T1||T2||T3).
3. Pick rs
$← Z∗p and compute
θ1 = K1 = (h0 · hx1 · hy2)1/(ω+sID) θ5 = g rs
θ2 = K2 = g1/(ω+sID) θ6 = hx1 · hy2
θ3 = K3 = g sID θ7 = hx3 · hy4
θ4 = K4 · uxδ11 · Gv(m)rs θ8 = gx
= usID0 · uxδ11 · Gv(m)rs θ9 = gy
so that
e(θ1,Ω · θ3) = e(h0, g) · e(θ6, g) (1)
e(θ2,Ω · θ3) = e(g, g) (2)
e(θ4, g) = e(u0, θ3) · e(u1, T1) · e(Gv(m), θ5) (3)
e(θ6, g) = e(h1, θ8) · e(h2, θ9) (4)
e(θ7, g) = e(h3, θ8) · e(h4, θ9). (5)
4. Commit to variables θi, for i = 1, . . . , 9. That is, for i = 1, . . . , 9, randomly choose ri, si, ti $← Zp and set
σ⃗i = (1, 1, θi) · g⃗1ri · g⃗2si · g⃗3ti . Then, commit to exponents δ1, δ2 ∈ Zp by choosing r10, s10, r11, s11 $← Z∗p
and setting σ⃗10 = ϕ⃗δ1 · g⃗1r10 · g⃗2s10 , σ⃗11 = ϕ⃗δ2 · g⃗1r11 · g⃗2s11 , where ϕ⃗ = g⃗3 ⊙ (1, 1, g).
5. Give proofs that committed variables θ1, . . . , θ9 satisfy (1)–(5) and that σ⃗10, σ⃗11 are commitment to values
δ1, δ2 satisfying
T1 = θ δ18 T2 = θ δ29 T3 = gδ1+δ2 . (6)
a. Relations (1)–(2) are quadratic pairing-product equations (in the Groth–Sahai terminology [36]) over
variables θ1, θ2, θ3, θ6. Each relation requires a proof consisting of 9 group elements. Let us call
these proofs π1 = (π⃗1,1, π⃗1,2, π⃗1,3), π2 = (π⃗2,1, π⃗2,2, π⃗2,3). Relations (6) are multi-exponentiation
equations. The first two ones are quadratic and the corresponding proofs π6 = (π⃗6,1, π⃗6,2, π⃗6,3) and
π7 = (π⃗7,1, π⃗7,2, π⃗7,3) both consist of 3 vectors of G3. The third relation of (6) is a linear multi-
exponentiation equation and the proof π8 = (π8,1, π8,2) is just 2 group elements.
b. Relations (3)–(5) are linear pairing-product equations over variables θ3, . . . , θ9. Corresponding proofs
cost 3 group elements each and π3, π4, π5 are all vectors of G3.
For clarity, we abstract away the construction of these proofs from the present description and refer to
Appendix C for details on how proof elements are calculated.
The signature finally consists of σ = (T1, T2, T3, σ⃗1, . . . , σ⃗11, π1, . . . , π8).
Verify(M, σ ,Y): parse the signature σ as (T1, T2, T3, σ⃗1, . . . , σ⃗11, π1, . . . , π8), and then, compute m = m1 . . .mn =
H(M||T1||T2||T3) andGv(m) = v0·∏nj=1 vmjj . Verifyingπ1, . . . , π8 entails to checkwhether the following equations
(some of which bear resemblance with relations (1)–(5)), where ϕ⃗ = g⃗3 ⊙ (1, 1, g), are all satisfied. The verifier
returns 1 if they are and 0 otherwise.
(1) F

σ⃗1, ι(Ω)⊙ σ⃗3
 = ιT e(h0, g)⊙ Fσ⃗6, ι(g)⊙ Fg⃗1, π⃗1,1⊙ Fg⃗2, π⃗1,2⊙ Fg⃗3, π⃗1,3
(2) F

σ⃗2, ι(Ω) · σ⃗3
 = ιT e(g, g)⊙ Fg⃗1, π⃗2,1⊙ Fg⃗2, π⃗2,2)⊙ F(g⃗3, π⃗2,3
(3) E

g, σ⃗4
 = Eu0, σ⃗3⊙ Eu1, ι(T1)⊙ EGv(m), σ⃗5⊙ Eπ3,1, g⃗1⊙ Eπ3,2, g⃗2⊙ Eπ3,3, g⃗3
(4) E

g, σ⃗6
 = Eh1, σ⃗8⊙ Eh2, σ⃗9⊙ Eπ4,1, g⃗1⊙ Eπ4,2, g⃗2⊙ Eπ4,3, g⃗3
(5) E

g, σ⃗7
 = Eh3, σ⃗8⊙ Eh4, σ⃗9⊙ Eπ5,1, g⃗1⊙ Eπ5,2, g⃗2⊙ Eπ5,3, g⃗3
(6) F

σ⃗8, σ⃗10
 = Fι(T1), ϕ⃗⊙ Fg⃗1, π⃗6,1⊙ Fg⃗2, π⃗6,2⊙ Fg⃗3, π⃗6,3
(7) F

σ⃗9, σ⃗11
 = Fι(T2), ϕ⃗⊙ Fg⃗1, π⃗7,1⊙ Fg⃗2, π⃗7,2⊙ Fg⃗3, π⃗7,3
(8) E

g, σ⃗10 ⊙ σ⃗11
 = E(T3, ϕ⃗)⊙ Eπ8,1, g⃗1⊙ Eπ8,2, g⃗2.
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Open(σ ,Y, S): parseσ as (T1, T2, T3, σ⃗1, . . . , σ⃗11, π1, . . . , π8) andS as {γ1, ω, α1, α2}. For each i ∈ {3, 8, 9}, parse element
σ⃗i as a BBS ciphertext (σi,1, σi,2, σi,3) ∈ G3 and compute θi = σi,3 ·σi,1−1/α1 ·σi,2−1/α2 . Check whether the database
transcripts contains a record transcripti = (X, K1, K2, K3, K4, y, sigi) such that θ3 = K3, θ8 = X and θ9 = gy. If yes,
return i as the signer’s index. Otherwise, return⊥.
Reveal(i, transcripts): to reveal the tracing trapdoor for userUi, scan the database transcripts to find the record transcripti =
(X, K1, K2, K3, K4, y, sigi) and output tracei := (X, y).
Trace(σ , tracei,Y): parseσ as (T1, T2, T3, σ⃗1, . . . , σ⃗11, π1, . . . , π8) and tracei as (X, y) ∈ G×Z∗p . Return 1 if e(T3/T 1/y2 , X) =
e(g, T1) and 0 otherwise.
Claim(M, σ , seci,Y): given σ = (T1, T2, T3, σ⃗1, . . . , σ⃗11, π1, . . . , π8), seci = x and part y of his membership certificate
certi, the signer i parses his long term key pair as (usk[i], upk[i]) and computes the hash values mc =
H(M||T1||T2||T3||upk[i]) = mc,1 . . .mc,n ∈ {0, 1}n and Gf (mc) = f0 · ∏nj=1 f mc,jj . Then, he picks rx, ry $← Zp
and computes
(Dx,1,Dx,2) =

f 1/x · Gf (mc)rx , T rx1

, (Dy,1,Dy,2) =

f 1/y · Gf (mc)ry , T ry2

.
The non-interactive claim consists of the tuple τ := (Dx,1,Dx,2,Dy,1,Dy,2, csigi), the last part of which is a digital
signature csigi = Signusk[i](Dx,1||Dx,2||Dy,1||Dy,2).
Claim-Verify(M, σ , τ , upk,Y): given a signature σ = (T1, T2, T3, σ⃗1, . . . , σ⃗11, π1, . . . , π8), to verify the non-interactive
claim τ = (Dx,1,Dx,2,Dy,1,Dy,2, csigi), compute the hash value Gf (mc) = f0 · ∏nj=1 f mc,jj , where mc =
H(M||T1||T2||T3||upk[i]) = mc,1 . . .mc,n ∈ {0, 1}n, and return 1 iff
e(f , T3) = e(Dx,1, T1) · e(Dy,1, T2)e(Gf (mc),Dx,2 · Dy,2) (7)
and Verifyupk[i]

(Dx,1||Dx,2||Dy,1||Dy,2), csigi
 = 1.
Correctness of the claiming algorithm. We can very easily verify that honestly generated claims (Dx,1,Dx,2,Dy,1,Dy,2)
are always accepted since they satisfy the relations
e(Dx,1, T1) = e(f , gδ1) · e(Gf (mc),Dx,2)
e(Dy,1, T2) = e(f , gδ2) · e(Gf (mc),Dy,2),
so that
e(Dx,1, T1)
e(Gf (mc),Dx,2)
· e(Dy,1, T2)
e(Gf (mc),Dy,2)
= ef , gδ1+δ2.
Including the signer’s long-term public key upk[i] among the inputs of the hash function H in the computation of mc
prevents other dishonest groups members from tampering with user i’s claim τ = (Dx,1,Dx,2,Dy,1,Dy,2, csigi) by replacing
csigi with their own signature on the claiming information (Dx,1||Dx,2||Dy,1||Dy,2). As we shall see in the proof of security
against framing attacks, dishonest group members will be unable to successfully claim an honest signer’s signature as long
as the Diffie–Hellman assumption holds.
Discussion. The opening algorithm performs BBS decryptions on ciphertexts σ⃗3, σ⃗8 and σ⃗9. Theoretically, decrypting only
σ⃗3 suffices (since sID must be unique in the database transcripts). However, also decrypting σ⃗8 and σ⃗9 simplifies the proofs
of security against misidentification attacks and framing attacks. In the former, for instance, a failure of the implicit tracing
mechanism implies a failure of the opening algorithm and reduces the number of cases to consider.
We note that the claiming algorithm does not make use of pairing-based non-interactive witness indistinguishable
proofs. However, such techniques canbe adapted towork in this context aswell. Indeed,we can alternatively build onGroth’s
techniques for constructing simulation-sound NIZK proofs [32, Section 6] and have the claimer generate a simulation-sound
extractable (see [32] for definitions) proof that he knows x, y such that T3 = T 1/x1 · T 1/y2 and the private key associated with
his long-term public key. Since simulation-sound extractable proofs are also non-malleable, the adversary cannot break the
AND link between the two statements and re-use the proof of knowledge of x, y such that T3 = T 1/x1 · T 1/y2 .
In comparison with the latter technique, the advantage of our approach is to provide a better efficiency as claims only
consist of four group elements and an ordinary signature. In addition, the signer’s key pair (usk[i], upk[i]) can be a public
key for any (not necessarily pairing-based) digital signature scheme.
Efficiency. From an efficiency standpoint, each signature consists of 83 group elements. Using a symmetric pairing
configuration with 256-bit prime order groups, we obtain signatures of 2.593 kB.
Signing requires a few tens of exponentiations. While a number of pairing evaluations seem necessary to verify at
first glance, probabilistic batch verification techniques (as exemplified in [11]) allow for dramatic improvements (at the
expense of a small probability of wrongly accepting an invalid signature) w.r.t. naive implementations where each pairing is
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calculated individually. When suitably processed altogether, verification equations 3–5 and 8 require to compute a product
of no more than 9 pairings and a few multi-exponentiations. Verification 1–2 and 6–7 can be handled by first translating
them into a randomized product of several bilinear maps of the type F(·, ·). The structure of matrices F(·, ·) then makes it
possible to decrease the overall verification cost of conditions 1–2 and 6–7 to the equivalent of a product of 15 pairings and
some multi-exponentiations.
4. Security
We establish the security of the scheme in the standard model under the assumptions of Section 2.1 and the assumption
that the digital signature scheme in use is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks (as defined in [31] and
recalled in Appendix A).
4.1. Security against misidentification attacks
Theorem 1 (Misidentification). The scheme is secure againstmisidentification attacks assuming that the ℓ-HSDHproblem,where
ℓ is the total number of Qa-join and Qp-join-queries, and the 1-mTDH problem are both hard in G.
Proof. To win the misidentification game, the adversary must output a non-trivial signature for which the opening
algorithm or the implicit tracing algorithm fail to point to an adversarially-controlled group member.
Let σ ⋆ = (T ⋆1 , T ⋆2 , T ⋆3 , σ⃗1⋆, . . . , σ⃗11⋆, π ⋆1 , . . . , π ⋆8 ) denote the adversary’s forgery and let us first assume that
Open(σ ⋆,Y, S) ∉ Ua. We distinguish three cases:
- Type I forgeries are those for which the BBS decryption θ ⋆3 = g sID of σ⃗3⋆ does not appear anywhere in transcripts. We
distinguish Type I-A forgeries, where the underlying θ ⋆3 = g sID never appears at any time during the game, from Type I-B
forgeries for which θ ⋆3 does not correspond to any record of transcripts but did appear (implicitly, as part of K3) in a join
protocol (triggered by a Qa-join query) that aborted before reaching its last step.
- Type II forgeries are such that σ⃗3⋆ decrypts to a value θ ⋆3 = g sID that was assigned to some honest user i ∈ Up (initialized
via a Qp-join-query). Such forgeries thus include those for which the opening algorithm points to some user i ∈ Up who
did not sign the corresponding message.
- Type III forgeries open in such a way that σ⃗3⋆ decrypts to the θ ⋆3 -value of an adversarially-controlled user in transcripts
but (σ⃗8
⋆
, σ⃗9
⋆
) does not. These forgeries include those that would defeat the implicit tracing algorithm.
Lemmas 1–3 show that, if the adversary could produce either of such forgeries, it would be possible to break the HSDH or
the 1-mTDH assumption.
Finally, one can readily check that an adversary cannot come up with a fake signature defeating the implicit tracing
algorithm without being one of the above kinds of forgeries. Indeed, let σ ⋆ be such a forgery and let us consider the
decryption θ ⋆3 of σ⃗3
⋆. If it differs from any K3 appearing in transcripts, σ ⋆ is actually a Type I forgery. If θ ⋆3 matches K3 in
transcripti for some i ∈ Up, we have a Type II forgery. We are left with the case where θ ⋆3 matches K3 in transcripti for some
i ∈ Ua. Here, a failure of the implicit tracing necessarily means thatA, acting as a cheating groupmember, was able to twist
his membership certificate so as to keep the same sID and alter the membership secret x or the ‘‘traceability component’’ y.
We thus have a Type III forgery. 
The security against Type I and Type II attacks can be established almost in the same way as traceability attacks are
handled in the security proof of the Boyen–Waters group signature [20] and the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 are available in
Appendix D.
Lemma 1. The advantage of any Type I forgerA is bounded by
Advmis-id-IA (λ) ≤ 2 · ℓa · Adv(ℓa+ℓp)-HSDH(λ)
where ℓa and ℓp denote the number of Qa-join and Qp-join-queries respectively.
Proof. Given in Appendix D.1. 
Lemma 2. The scheme is secure against Type II forgeries under the HSDH assumption. The advantage of any Type II adversaryA
is at most
Advmis-id-IIA (λ, n) ≤ 4 · n · ℓs ·

1− ℓa
p
−1
· Advℓa-HSDH(λ)
where ℓa and ℓs stand for the number of Qa-join and Qsig-queries.
Proof. Detailed in Appendix D.2. 
Type III forgeries are somewhat trickier to deal with. Indeed, the proof of Lemma 3 is the most difficult part of the proof
of security against misidentification attacks and it appeals to the non-standard 1-mTDH assumption. We leave it as an
interesting problem to hedge against misidentification attacks using only the HSDH assumption.
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Lemma 3. The advantage of any Type III adversaryA is bounded by
Advmis-id-IIIA (λ, n) ≤ ℓa ·

1− 1
p
−1
· Adv1-mTDH(λ)
where ℓa is the number of Qa-join-queries.
Proof. In a successful Type III forgery σ ⋆, by assumption, the opening algorithm decrypts σ⃗3⋆ to a value θ ⋆3 = σ ⋆3,3 ·σ ⋆3,1−1/α1 ·
σ ⋆3,2
−1/α2 that equals some K3 appearing in the transcript of a user in Ua whereas the BBS decryption of (σ⃗8⋆, σ⃗9⋆) does not
match the values (X, y) that were assigned to that user.
The simulatorB receives as input amodified 1-TripleDiffie–Hellman instance consisting of (g, A = ga, B = gb) ∈ G3 and
a single pair (C = g1/(a+c), c) ∈ G×Z∗p . To prepare the public keyY, it picksω, ρu,0, ρu,1, β0, . . . , βn $← Z∗p . It setsΩ = gω ,
vi = gβi , for i = 0, . . . , n, and ui = gρu,i for i = 0, 1. Then, it draws new random values ρ, γ0, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4, x⋆, y⋆ $← Z∗p
and defines h1 = gρ · Bγ1 , h2 = gρ · Bγ2 , h3 = gγ3 · Aρ , h4 = gγ4 · Aρ and h0 = gγ0 · h−x⋆1 · h−y
⋆
2 . It finally chooses vector sets
g, f to have perfectly sound proof systems.
The group public key is
Y :=

g, {hi}i=0,...,4, Ω, u0, u1, {vi}i=0,...,n, g, f

.
At the outset of the simulation,B draws an index i⋆ $← {1, . . . , ℓa} and initializes variables ctra, ctr ′a, ctrp ← 0.
- Qa-join-queries:B increments ctr ′a and considers the following two cases.
- If ctr ′a ≠ i⋆,B acts as the group manager as specified by the protocol (recall that it knows ω and can always properly
generate certificates).
- If ctr ′a = i⋆,B simulatesA’s view in the first step of the join protocol to forceA’s membership secret to be x⋆ (so that
the public value is X = gx⋆ ). The simulation implicity defines sIDi⋆ = 1a+c − ω (and thus 1/(sIDi⋆ + ω) = a + c) by
setting
K1 = (h0 · hx⋆1 · hy
⋆
2 )
1
ω+si⋆ = (A · gc)γ0
K2 = g
1
ω+si⋆ = A · gc
K3 = g si⋆ = g1/(a+c) · g−ω = C · g−ω
K4 = usi⋆0 = (C · g−ω)ρu,0 .
In Step 2,B first sends K1, K2, K3, y⋆ toA and aborts if he fails to send back a valid signature on X ||K1||K2||K3||gy⋆ . If
A correctly answers, B hands him K4, increments ctra and stores a record (N, transcriptsN), with N = ctra + ctrp in
transcripts.
- Qp-join-queries and Qsig-queries: to answer Qp-join-queries, B follows the join protocol using the group secret key
S := (γ1, ω, p) and increments ctrp. It can also perfectly answer signing queries on behalf of an honest user since it
knows their membership certificates and secrets.
- QY and Qreveal(i)-queries: can be handled according to the specification of the scheme sinceB always knows the values
requested byA.
- Qsig-queries: always involve users in Up andB thus always knows private elements that it needs to answer the query.
Eventually, the adversary A comes up with a message M⋆ along with a valid traceable signature σ ⋆ = (T ⋆1 , T ⋆2 , T ⋆3 ,
σ⃗1
⋆
, . . . , σ⃗11
⋆
, π ⋆1 , . . . , π
⋆
8 ) that must be a type III forgery. At this stage, B fails if the decryption of σ⃗3
⋆ differs from the
element K3 = C · g−ω thatB calculated at the i⋆th Qa-join-query (as it guessed the wrong i⋆).
Otherwise, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 9}\{3}, it decrypts other σ⃗i⋆ into θ ⋆i . as in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2. Since the proof
system is configured for the perfect soundness setting, it comes out that
θ ⋆1 = (h0 · hx
′
1 · hy
′
2 )
1
ω+sIDi⋆ θ ⋆6 = hx
′
1 · hy
′
2
= gγ0 · h(x′−x⋆)1 · hy′−y⋆2 a+c θ ⋆7 = hx′3 · hy′4
θ ⋆8 = gx
′
θ ⋆9 = gy
′
for some x′, y′ ∈ Z∗p thatB does not know. However, if we set∆x = x′ − x⋆ and∆y = y′ − y⋆,B can compute
Z1 = θ ⋆1/K1 =

h∆x1 · h∆y2
a+c = gρ(∆x+∆y) · Bγ1∆x+γ2∆ya+c
Z2 = θ ⋆7/(hx
⋆
3 · hy
⋆
4 ) = h∆x3 · h∆y4 = gγ3∆x+γ4∆y · Aρ(∆x+∆y)
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Z3 = θ ⋆8/gx
⋆ = g∆x
Z4 = θ ⋆9/gy
⋆ = g∆y
Z5 = θ ⋆6/(hx
⋆
1 · hy
⋆
2 ) = h∆x1 · h∆y2 = gρ(∆x+∆y) · Bγ1∆x+γ2∆y
which in turn reveal
Z6 = (A · gc)ρ(∆x+∆y) =

Z2/(Z
γ3
3 · Zγ44 )

· (Z3 · Z4)ρc
Z7 = Bγ1∆x+γ2∆y = Z5 · (Z3 · Z4)ρ
and finally
Z8 = gab(γ1∆x+γ2∆y) = Ba(γ1∆x+γ2∆y) = Z1/(Z6 · Z c7),
so that, if we implicitly define µ = γ1∆x+ γ2∆y,B has eventually found a triple
(gµ, gbµ, gabµ) = (Zγ13 · Zγ24 , Z7, Z8).
Since γ1 and γ2 are both uniformly random and perfectly hidden fromA’s view, we have gµ ≠ 1G (and thus γ1∆x+γ2∆y ≠
0 mod p) with overwhelming probability (greater than 1−1/p) and the triple (gµ, gbµ, gabµ) is non-trivial. We easily check
that, ifA is successful, so isB as long as it correctly guesses i⋆ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓa}. 
4.2. Security against framing attacks
Establishing the security of the scheme against framing attacks also entails to separately consider several kinds of
forgeries.
Theorem 2 (Non-frameability). The scheme is secure against framing attacks assuming that: (i) the 1-mTDH assumption holds
inG; (ii) the underlying digital signature is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks; (iii)H is a collision-resistant
hash function.
Proof. As required by the model, we consider two kinds of frameability attacks.
- Type I attacks: the adversaryA outputs a pair (M⋆, σ ⋆) that opens or traces to signer i ∈ Ub whereas i did not produce
a pair (M, σ ) such that (M, σ ) ≡s (M⋆, σ ⋆). We further distinguish Type I-A attacks, where no signer i ∈ Ub produced
(M, σ ) with (M, σ ) ≡s (M⋆, σ ⋆), from Type I-B attacks, where at least one such pair was produced by another signer
j ≠ i.
- Type II attacks: the adversary breaks the security of the claiming procedure. In other words, he outputs a tuple
(M⋆, σ ⋆, τ ⋆, upk⋆) that causes the experiment of Definition 5 to return 1 in either Step 5 (i.e., the adversary forges an
honest member’s claim) or Step 6 (i.e., an honest member’s signature is claimed in the name of somebody else).
Lemmas 4 and 5 show that no PPT adversary can produce either kind of forgery as long as the 1-mTDH assumption holds. 
The proof of Lemma 4 is based on standard techniques (notably in the simulation of signing queries as in [14,45]) and
separately considers two kinds of Type I attack. An alternative proof allows considering a single kind of Type I attack.
However, this alternative reduction is looser by another multiplicative factor of O(ℓb) (since it has to guess upfront which
honest user will be framed) and eventually ends up with a degradation factor of O(ℓs · ℓb). By separately analyzing Type I-A
and Type I-B attacks as in Lemma 4, the security bound only declines with max(ℓs, ℓb).
Lemma 4. The scheme is secure against framing attacks of Type I if the 1-mTDH problem is hard and ifH is a collision-resistant
hash function. More precisely, the advantage of any adversary after ℓs signing queries, ℓb Qb-join-queries and ℓc Qclaim-queries is
at most
Advfra-I(λ, n) ≤ 2 · AdvCR(n)+ 4n ·max(ℓs, ℓb) ·

1− ℓc
p
−1 · Adv1-mTDH(λ),
where the first term accounts for the probability of finding collisions onH .
Proof. As discussed earlier, we distinguish two cases. The bound of the lemma’s statement stems from the fact thatB has to
guess upfront, by flipping a fair binary coin independently ofA’s view, whetherAwill mount a Type I-A or Type I-B attack
and set up the scheme accordingly. With probability 1/2,B guesses the correct type of attack and the result follows.
Type I-A attacks.We first assume that a Type I-A adversaryA comes up with a forgery (M⋆, σ ⋆) that traces to some honest
user i ∈ Ub and that no message-signature pair (M, σ ) such that (M, σ ) ≡s (M⋆, σ ⋆) was produced by any honest group
member.We show that such an adversary allows solving a problem that is not easier than 1-mTDH since it consists in finding
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a triple (C1, C2, C3) = (gµ, gbµ, gabµ) given only (g, A = ga, B = gb). We note that a triple (C1, C2, C3) is an admissible
solution if and only if it satisfies
e(C3, g) = e(C2, A) and e(C1, B) = e(C2, g). (8)
Given a problem instance (g, A = ga, B = gb), the simulator B chooses the GM private key ω, α1, α2 $← Z∗p . It sets
u1 = A ∈ G and also picks k $← {0, . . . , n}, integers ρf , ρu,0, ρ0, . . . , ρn $← Z∗p and β0, . . . , βn $← {0, . . . , 2ℓs − 1}. It then
definesΩ = gω , v0 = uβ0−2kℓs1 · gρ0 , vi = uβi1 · gρi for i = 1, . . . , n as well as u0 = gρu,0 and f = Bρf . It also sets hi = gγi ∈ G
for i = 0, . . . , 4 with γ0, . . . , γ4 $← Z∗p and chooses g for the perfect soundness setting as specified by the setup algorithm,
with g⃗1 = (g1 = gα1 , 1, g), g⃗2 = (1, g2 = gα2 , g) and g⃗3 = g⃗1ξ1 ⊙ g⃗2ξ2 , for some random exponents ξ1, ξ2 $← Z∗p . It finally
chooses f = (f0, f1, . . . , fn) $← Gn+1 at random.
Throughout the game,B interacts withA as follows.
- QS-queries: ifA decides to corrupt the groupmanager,B hands him the groupmanager’s private keyS = {γ1, ω, α1, α2}.
- Qb-join-queries: when A, acting as a corrupted group manager, wants to introduce a new honest user i in the group, B
starts interacting withA in an execution of the join protocol and assumes the role of the new user. Namely, B chooses
xi
$← Z∗p , sets Xi = Bxi ∈ G and simulates A’s view in the first step to force user i’s membership secret to implicitly
become seci = bxi (and the associated public value to be Xi). At Step 2 of the join protocol,A outputs K1, K2, K3, y andB
generates a signature on Xi||K1||K2||K3||gy. Then,A replies with the final part K4 of user i’s certificate.
- QY-queries: are treated as in the proof of Lemma 1 and the simulator always knows the values requested byA.
- Qsig-queries: whenA asks user i ∈ Ub to sign amessageM ,B first retrieves themembership certificate (K1, K2, K3, K4, y)
and the previously stored Xi = Bxi . It randomly picks δ1, δ2 $← Z∗p and computes a tuple of traceability values
(T1 = X δ1i , T2 = gyδ2 , T3 = gδ1+δ2), which is hashed asm = m1 . . .mn = H(M||T1||T2||T3). Then, the number theoretic
hash value Gv(m) = v0 ·∏nj=1 vmjj can be expressed as Gv(m) = uJv(m)1 · gKv(m) where
Jv(m) = β0 − 2kℓs +
n−
j=1
βjmj, Kv(m) = ρ0 +
n−
j=1
ρjmj.
Here,B aborts if Jv(m) = 0. Otherwise, it picks rs $← Z∗p and computes
θ4 = K4 · Gv(m)rs · T−
Kv(m)
Jv(m)
1 , θ5 = g rs · T
− 1Jv(m)
1

,
which has the required distribution since, if we implicitly define r˜s = rs − (bxiδ1)/Jv(m), we can write (θ4 = K4 ·
uxiδ11 · Gv(m)r˜s , θ5 = g r˜s). Together with certificate components (K1, K2, K3), the newly generated pair (θ4, θ5) allows
computing a traceable signature in a simple way since elements (θ6, θ7) can be obtained as (θ6, θ7) = (Xγ1i · hy2, Xγ3i · hy4).
- Qclaim-queries: at any time, A is also allowed to request claims for signatures that were previously generated
by honest group members. For each claiming query (i,M, σ ), where the traceable signature σ parses as
(T1, T2, T3, σ⃗1, . . . , σ⃗11, π1, . . . , π8), algorithm B returns ⊥ if i ∉ Ub or if the database Sigs does not contain an entry
(i,M, σ ′) such that σ ′ contains (T1, T2, T3). Otherwise, B is always able to compute a valid claim τ . Indeed, the pair
(D1,x,D2,x) = (f 1/(bxi) · G(mc)rx , T rx1 ) is computable from f 1/(bxi) = gρf /xi and (D1,y,D2,y) does not involve any secret.
Finally, A outputs a traceable signature σ ⋆ = (T ⋆1 , T ⋆2 , T ⋆3 , σ⃗1⋆, . . . , σ⃗11⋆, π ⋆1 , . . . , π ⋆8 ), for some message M⋆, that traces to
some user i⋆ ∈ Ub and for which no honest user produced a signature involving the same (M⋆, T ⋆1 , T ⋆2 , T ⋆3 ). In the event
that Sigs contains a tuple (M ′, T ′1, T
′
2, T
′
3) for which m
⋆ = H(M⋆||T ⋆1 ||T ⋆2 ||T ⋆3 ) = H(M ′||T ′1||T ′2||T ′3) but (M ′, T ′1, T ′2, T ′3) ≠
(M⋆, T ⋆1 , T
⋆
2 , T
⋆
3 ), A was necessarily able to break the collision-resistance of H . Otherwise, B uses α1, α2 to BBS-decrypt
θ ⋆i = σi,3 · σ ⋆i,1−1/α1 · σ ⋆i,2−1/α2 for i = 1, . . . , 9. The perfect soundness of the proof system ensures that
θ ⋆3 = g sID⋆ θ ⋆4 = usID⋆0 · ux
′δ1
1 · Gv(m⋆)rs θ ⋆5 = g rs T ⋆1 = gx
′δ1 ,
for some exponents sID⋆ , rs, x′, δ1 ∈ Z∗p , and where
Gv(m⋆) = v0 ·
n∏
j=1
v
mj
j = uJv(m
⋆)
1 · gKv(m
⋆).
Then, the simulator B halts and declares failure if Jv(m⋆) ≠ 0. Otherwise, B is necessarily able to compute Θ = ux′δ11 =
θ ⋆4/(θ
⋆
5
Kv(m⋆) · θ ⋆3 ρu,0), which must satisfy the equality e(Θ, g) = e(u1, T ⋆1 ). Since σ ⋆ traces to user i⋆ by assumption, wemust
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have e(Xi⋆ , T ⋆3 /T
⋆
2
1/y⋆) = e(T ⋆1 , g), where y⋆ is part of the tracing trapdoor that A assigned to i⋆ and Xi⋆ = Bxi⋆ for some xi⋆
which is known toB. Since u1 = A, we find that the assignment
C⋆1 = T ⋆3 /T ⋆2 1/y
⋆
C⋆2 = T ⋆1 1/xi⋆ C⋆3 = Θ1/xi⋆
must satisfy relation (8) and thus solve the problem instance.
B’s probability not to abort can be shown to be at least 1/(2nℓs), as in the proof of Lemma 2. The situation where σ ⋆
accuses user i⋆ via the opening algorithm (instead of the implicit tracing) can be handled in the sameway. Indeed, the perfect
soundness of the proof system guarantees that, if a signature opens to user i⋆, the tracing algorithm necessarily points to the
same user.
Type I-B attacks. We still have to consider Type I-B forgeries σ ⋆ that open or trace to some user i⋆ but involve a tuple
(M⋆, T ⋆1 , T
⋆
2 , T
⋆
3 ) also appearing in a signature produced by j
⋆ ≠ i⋆ ∈ Ub. We show that such forgeries imply an algorithm
solving an equivalent formulation of the Computational Diffie–Hellman problem (that is not easier than 1-mTDH) which is
to compute gb/a given (A = ga, B = gb). The simulatorB performs the setup as in the expectation of a Type I-A attack but
chooses u1 ∈ G so as to know ρu,1 = logg(u1). Another difference is that, while f is still set as f = Bρf , for some random
ρf
$← Zp, the vector f = (f0, f1, . . . , fn) is chosen by setting fi = f αf ,i · Aβf ,i , for randomly drawn αf ,i, βf ,i $← Zp, for i = 0
to n. As in the case of Type I-A attacks, h1, h3 ∈ G are chosen in such a way thatB knows γ1 = logg(h1) and γ3 = logg(h3).
Additionally,B chooses an index k $← {1, . . . , ℓb} and interacts with the adversaryA as follows.
- QS and QY-queries: are handled as when dealing with Type I-A attacks.
- Qb-join-queries: when A decides to introduce a new user i, B’s behavior depends on the index i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓb} of the
Qb-join-query.
- If i ≠ k, B runs the join protocol on behalf of the prospective honest group member. It chooses xi $← Z∗p , sets
Xi = Axi ∈ G and simulates A’s view to end up with the public value Xi (so that seci = axi is the implicitly defined
membership secret). The next steps of the join protocol are executed as in the case of Type I-A forgeries.
- If i = k, B proceeds as in the first case but rather simulates A’s view to force the public value Xk to become B = gb
(which implicitly sets seck = b).
- Qsig-queries: sinceB knows ρu,1 = logg(u1), γ1 = logg(h1) and γ3 = logg(h3), it can perfectly simulate Qsig-queries by
computing θ4 using u
seci
1 = Xρu,1i and the pair (θ6, θ7) as (Xγ1i · hy2, Xγ3i · hy4). The simulator also retains the random values
δ1, δ2 ∈ Zp that are used to calculate T1, T2, T3 at each query.
- Qclaim-queries: for each claiming query (i,M, σ ), the simulator B first performs the same checks as in the case of Type
I-A attacks. Then, B is able to generate claims on behalf of user k since Xk = B and f 1/b = gρf is computable. For each
user i ∈ Ub such that i ≠ k,B first computes the n-bit stringmc = H(M||T1||T2||T3||upk) = mc,1 . . .mc,n ∈ {0, 1}n and
evaluates J = αf ,0 +∑nj=1 αf ,jmc,j and K = βf ,0 +∑nj=1 βf ,jmc,j such that Gf (mc) can be expressed as Gf (mc) = f J · AK .
It aborts in the unlikely event that J = 0 (since the random values αf ,0, . . . , αf ,n are completely independent of A’s
view, this occurs with negligible probability 1/p at each query). Otherwise,B recalls the value δ1 ∈ Zp such that we had
T1 = X δ1i = Axiδ1 . It then picks rx $← Zp and computes
(D1,x,D2,x) =

Gf (mc)rx · g−K/(xiJ), T rx1 · g−δ1/J

,
which has the proper distribution since it can be expressed as (f 1/(axi) · Gf (mc)r˜x , T r˜x1 ), where r˜x = rx − 1/(axiJ).
After polynomially-many queries,A outputs a Type I-B forgery σ ⋆ that opens or traces to some user i⋆ ∈ Ub. By assumption,
another user j⋆ ∈ Ub must have issued a signature with the same (M⋆, T ⋆1 , T ⋆2 , T ⋆3 ). At this stage, B fails if j⋆ is not the user
that was introduced at the kth Qb-join-query. With probability 1/ℓb however, B correctly guessed k. It also still knows the
exponent δ1 that was used by user j⋆ to calculate T ⋆1 = X δ1k = Bδ1 . Moreover, since σ ⋆ traces to user i⋆, there must exist
δ′1, δ
′
2 ∈ Zp such that (T ⋆1 , T ⋆2 , T ⋆3 ) = (Axi⋆ δ′1 , gyi⋆ δ′2 , gδ′1+δ′2) and, given that B also knows the tracing trapdoor yi⋆ (that was
supplied byA during the kth Qb-join-query), it can compute gδ
′
1 = T ⋆3 /T ⋆2 1/yi⋆ and thus gb/a = (gδ′1)(xi⋆ /δ1). 
The security against Type II attacks relies on the standard Computational Diffie–Hellman assumption and the security
of the ordinary signature scheme in the sense of [31]. It makes (now classical) use of the technique of [13,45] and the
‘‘programmability’’ [37] of the number theoretic hash function Gf : {0, 1}n → G. The proof is deferred to Appendix E.
Lemma 5. The scheme is secure against Type II framing attacks if the Computational Diffie–Hellman problem is hard in G, if
H is a collision-resistant hash function and if the ordinary digital signature is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message
attacks. More precisely, the advantage of any adversary after ℓs signing queries, ℓb Qb-join-queries and ℓc claiming queries is at
most Advfra-II(λ, n) ≤ AdvCR(n) + 2 · Adveuf-sig(λ) + 4 · n · ℓc · AdvCDH(λ), where the first and second terms account for the
probability of breaking the collision-resistance ofH and the existential unforgeability of the signature, respectively.
Proof. Given in Appendix E. 
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4.3. Anonymity
Since we introduced a claiming oracle in the modeling of anonymity, we are faced with the additional difficulty of
simulating the Qclaim oracle without always knowing the appropriate secret elements in the reduction. Fortunately, we can
prove the result using only the DLIN assumption.
Theorem 3 (Anonymity). The scheme is anonymous assuming that the Decision Linear Problem is hard inG. More precisely, we
have
AdvanonA (λ) ≤ ℓp ·
ℓc
p
+ 3 · AdvDLING (λ)

where ℓp and ℓc denote the number of Qp-join-queries and the number of Qclaim-queries, respectively.
Proof. The proof proceeds with a sequence of games organized in such a way that even a computationally unbounded
adversary has no advantage in the final game while the first one is the real attack game. Throughout the sequence, we
always call Si the event that the adversary wins and his advantage is measured by Advi = |Pr[Si] − 1/2|. Also, when we
speak of user i, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓp}, we mean the ith user that joins the group after a Qp-join query.
Game 1: operates as the real game does. The challengerB performs the setup according to the specification of the scheme.
It chooses random exponents ω, γ1, . . . , γ4, ρu,1, ξ1, ξ2
$← Z∗p and sets gω , hi = gγi for i = 1, . . . , 4 and u1 = gρu,1 . It also
picks h0, u0, f , g1, g2
$← G and vectors v ∈ Gn+1, f = (f0, f1, . . . , fn) $← Gn+1 and defines g⃗1 = (g1, 1, g), g⃗2 = (1, g2, g),
g⃗3 = g⃗1ξ1 ⊙ g⃗2ξ2 . Using ω, γ1, it answers Qa-join and Qp-join-queries and updates transcripts each time. When the adversaryA
makes aQreveal-query (resp.Qsig-query),B uses the database transcripts to return the queried tracing trapdoor (resp. recover
the appropriate certi and seci and generate a signature on behalf of user i ∈ Up). At the challenge phase, the adversary
chooses two users i⋆0, i
⋆
1 ∈ Up such that i⋆0, i⋆1 ∉ revs and is returned a traceable signature σ ⋆ on behalf of signer i⋆d⋆ . Unlike
what occurs in the real game, the challenger retains the values γi = logg(hi), for i = 1, . . . , 4, and ρu,1 = logg(u1) but this
does not impactA’s behavior. Eventually, he outputs a guess d′ ∈ {0, 1} and his advantage is Adv1 = |Pr[S1] − 1/2|, where
S1 denotes the event that d′ = d⋆.
Game 2: we modify the simulation. At the beginning,B picks an index i⋆ $← {1, . . . , ℓp}. In the challenge phase,B aborts if
A’s chosen pair (i⋆0, i
⋆
1) does not contain i
⋆. It also fails if i⋆ is ever queried to Qreveal before the challenge step. Assuming that
B is lucky when choosing i⋆ at the outset of the game (which is the case with probability 2/ℓp since i⋆ is independent ofA’s
view), the introduced abortion rule does not apply. We can write Adv2 = 2 · Adv1/ℓp.
Game 3: we add yet another abortion rule. At the challenge step, wemust have i⋆ ∈ {i⋆0, i⋆1} unless the abortion rule of Game
2 applies. The new rule is the following: whenB flips its secret coin d⋆ $← {0, 1}, it aborts if i⋆d⋆ ≠ i⋆. With probability 1/2,
this new rule does not apply and we have Adv3 = 1/2 · Adv2.
Game 4: we bring two modifications to the setup phase. Namely, B considers random group elements Z1 = gz1 , Z2 = gz2
in G. It first defines f = Zρf2 for a random αf $← Zp. The vector f⃗ = (f0, f1, . . . , fn) ∈ Gn+1 is then generated as follows. For
i = 0 to n, it picks αf ,i, βf ,i $← Zp and sets fi = f αf ,i · Zβf ,i1 . This change is purely conceptual since the distribution of f and
(f0, f1, . . . , fn) remains unchanged. We thus have Pr[S4] = Pr[S3] and Adv4 = Adv3.
In the upcoming games, itwill be convenient to define functions J, K : {0, 1}n → Zp thatmap n-bit stringsm = m1 . . .mn
onto J(m) = αf ,0 +∑nj= αf ,jmj and K(m) = βf ,0 +∑nj= βf ,jmj.
Game 5: we introduce a failure event F5. Namely, when the simulator B has to claim a previously generated signature
σ = (T1, T2, T3, σ⃗1, . . . , σ⃗11, π1, . . . , π8), it first computes the hash valuemc = mc,1 . . .mc,n = H(M||T1||T2||T3||upk[i]) ∈
{0, 1}n, evaluates J(mc) = αf ,0 + ∑nj=1 αf ,jmc,j and aborts in the event3 that J(mc) = 0. Since the values {αf ,i}ni=0 are
completely random and independent of A’s view, this can only happen by pure chance. At each query, the probability to
have J(mc) = 0 is thus at most 1/p. In addition, Game 5 and Game 4 proceed identically until event F5 causesB to abort. It
comes out that |Pr[S5] − Pr[S4]| ≤ Pr[F5] ≤ ℓc/p.
Game 6: we modify the treatment of signing queries involving user i⋆. Now, B re-uses the values z1 = logg(Z1) and
z2 = logg(Z2) (introduced in Game 4) and implicitly defines user i⋆’s membership secret to be seci⋆ = z1 while the value y
of his membership certificate is z2. More precisely, its membership certificate is calculated as
K1 =

h0 · Zγ11 · Zγ22
1/(ω+sIDi⋆ ) K2 = g1/(ω+sIDi⋆ ) K3 = g sIDi⋆ K4 = usIDi⋆ ,
for a random sIDi⋆
$← Z∗p . Unless the failure event of Game 2 occurs, no Qreveal query is made for i⋆ andB can answer signing
queries without using z1, z2 and knowing only Z1, Z2. Indeed, signing queries related to i⋆ can be answered by calculating
θ6 = Zγ11 · Zγ22 , θ7 = Zγ31 · Zγ42 , θ8 = Z1, θ9 = Z2, T1 = Zδ11 , T2 = Zδ22 and T3 = gδ1+δ2 , using random δ1, δ2 $← Z∗p . It then
3 A difference with the security proof of Waters’ identity-based encryption scheme [45] is that we do not need J(.) to cancel in the challenge phase,
which is why {αf ,i}ni=0 can be chosen uniformly in Zp (rather than in a much smaller interval as in [45]). For the same reason, Game 5 and Game 4 can be
linked by a transition based on a failure event of small probability and no artificial abort step is needed.
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sets uz1δ11 = T ρu,11 in the computation of θ4. The challenge signature, which B generates on behalf of i⋆ unless one of the
previous failure events occurs, is produced in the same way. These changes do not affect A’s view, so that Pr[S6] = Pr[S5]
and Adv6 = Adv5.
Game 7: we modify the treatment of Qclaim-queries involving user i⋆. Recall that, since Game 6, the simulator B answers
Qsig-queries involving i⋆ by setting T1 = Zδ11 , T2 = Zδ22 and T3 = gδ1+δ2 for random δ1, δ2 $← Z∗p . In this game, when it
comes to claim a previously generated signature (T1, T2, T3, σ⃗1, . . . , σ⃗11, π1, . . . , π8), B computes mc = mc,1 . . .mc,n =
H(M||T1||T2||T3||upk[i⋆]) and then evaluates functions J(mc) = αf ,0 +∑nj= αf ,jmc,j and K(mc) = βf ,0 +∑nj= βf ,jmc,j such
that Gf (mc) = f0 · ∏nj=1 f mc,jj = f J(mc ) · ZK(mc )1 . We must have J(mc) ≠ 0 unless the failure event introduced in Game 5
applies. As long as J(mc) ≠ 0,B can pick rx $← Zp, implicitly define r˜x = rx − 1/(z1J(mc)) and compute the first part of the
claim as
(Dx,1,Dx,2) = (Gf (mc)rx · g−K(mc )/J(mc ), T rx1 · g−δ1/J(mc )) = (f 1/z1 · Gf (mc)r˜x , T r˜x1 ). (9)
As for the second piece (Dy,1,Dy,2) = (f 1/z2 · Gf (mc)ry , T ry2 ) of the claim, B can generate it from f 1/z2 = gρf , which is
computable thanks to theway that f is chosen since Game 4. In Game 7, we note thatB does not use the values z1, z2 ∈ Zp at
any time. Still, the introducedmodifications are only conceptual and do not alterA’s view.We can thuswrite Pr[S7] = Pr[S6]
and Adv7 = Adv6.
Game 8: we modify the setup phase and choose g⃗3 as g⃗3 = g⃗1ξ1 ⊙ g⃗2ξ2 ⊙ (1, 1, g)−1 instead of g⃗3 = g⃗1ξ1 ⊙ g⃗2ξ2 . We note
that g⃗1, g⃗3, g⃗3 are now linearly independent. Any noticeable change in the adversary’s behavior is easily seen4 to imply a
statistical test for the Decision Linear problem, so that we can write |Pr[S8] − Pr[S7]| = 2 · AdvDLIN(B).
Game 9: in this game, wemodify the generation of the challenge signature σ ⋆ on behalf of i⋆. The generation of σ⃗1⋆, . . . , σ⃗9⋆
and π ⋆1 , . . . , π
⋆
5 is still made using the actual witnesses seci⋆, certi⋆ . In particular,B sets σ⃗8
⋆ = ι(Z1)⊙ g⃗1r8 ⊙ g⃗2s8 ⊙ g⃗3t8 and
σ⃗9
⋆ = ι(Z2)⊙ g⃗1r9 ⊙ g⃗2s9 ⊙ g⃗3t9 as in Game 5. However, instead of generating σ⃗10⋆, σ⃗11⋆ as well as π ⋆6 , π ⋆7 and π ⋆8 using δ1, δ2
such that T ⋆1 = Zδ11 and T ⋆2 = Zδ22 , B uses the simulated reference string and its trapdoor information (ξ1, ξ2) to generate
simulated proofs. Namely, σ⃗10
⋆ = g⃗1r10 ⊙ g⃗2s10 and σ⃗11⋆ = g⃗1r11 ⊙ g⃗2s11 are both calculated as commitments to 0. As for
proof elements π ⋆6 , π
⋆
7 , π
⋆
8 ,B obtains them as
π ⋆6 = (π⃗61⋆, π⃗62⋆, π⃗63⋆)
=

σ⃗8
⋆r10 ⊙ ι(g)r10t8 ⊙ ι(T ⋆1 )−ξ1 ⊙ σ⃗10⋆−ξ1t8 , σ⃗8⋆s10 ⊙ ι(g)s10t8 ⊙ ι(T ⋆1 )−ξ2 ⊙ σ⃗10⋆−ξ2t8 , σ⃗10⋆t8

,
π ⋆7 = (π⃗71⋆, π⃗72⋆, π⃗73⋆)
=

σ⃗9
⋆r11 ⊙ ι(g)r11t9 ⊙ ι(T ⋆2 )−ξ1 ⊙ σ⃗11⋆−ξ1t9 , σ⃗9⋆s11 ⊙ ι(g)s11t9 ⊙ ι(T ⋆1 )−ξ2 ⊙ σ⃗11⋆−ξ2t9 , σ⃗11⋆t9

,
π ⋆8 =

g r10+r11 · T ⋆3−ξ1 , g s10+s11 · T ⋆3−ξ2

.
It can be checked that verification equations 6–8 are still satisfied by the above assignment. To achieve perfect witness
indistinguishability, π ⋆6 and π
⋆
7 must be re-randomized (as explained in [36]) to be uniform in the space of valid proofs for
quadratic equations. On a simulated CRS (g⃗1, g⃗2, g⃗3), simulated proofs are known to be perfectly indistinguishable from real
proofs. Hence, this change is only conceptual and we have Pr[S9] = Pr[S8].
Game 10: we bring a new change to the generation of the challenge σ ⋆. In Game 9, we had T ⋆1 = Zδ11 , T ⋆2 = Zδ22 and
T ⋆3 = gδ1+δ2 , where δ1, δ2 $← Z∗p . Now, B rather chooses T ⋆3 $← G at random (and still computes π ⋆6 , π ⋆7 , π ⋆8 from
T ⋆1 , T
⋆
2 , T
⋆
3 as in Game 9). Under the Decision Linear assumption
5 in G, this change is not noticeable by A and we have
|Pr[S10] − Pr[S9]| ≤ AdvDLIN(B).
In Game 10, we claim that Pr[S10] = 1/2 (and Adv10 is thus zero). To see this, let us consider what A knows in the
information theoretic sense. By observing two signatures from i⋆ = i⋆d⋆ (and more precisely the traceability values T1, T2, T3
in each signature), A can figure out the values of his membership secret seci⋆ = z1 and part y = z2 of his membership
certificate. He can also infer their counterpart for user i⋆1−d⋆ by requesting two signatures from the latter.
When A sees the challenge σ ⋆ however, T ⋆1 , T
⋆
2 and T
⋆
3 reveal no information on d
⋆ ∈ {0, 1}. Indeed, T ⋆3 is completely
random and T ⋆1 , T
⋆
2 are compatible with either candidate i
⋆
0, i
⋆
1. Moreover, σ⃗1
⋆
, . . . , σ⃗9
⋆ are perfectly hiding commitments
and, in the WI setting, proofs π ⋆1 , . . . , π
⋆
5 reveal no information on underlying witnesses seci⋆ , certi⋆ . Finally σ⃗10
⋆, σ⃗11
⋆ are
independent of d⋆ ∈ {0, 1} and so are simulated proofs π ⋆6 , π ⋆7 , π ⋆8 . 
4 Indeed, Pr[B(g1, g2, gξ11 , gξ22 , gξ1+ξ2 ) = 1] and Pr[B(g1, g2, gξ11 , gξ22 , gξ1+ξ2−1) = 1] are both within distance AdvDLIN(B) from Pr[B(g1, g2, gξ11 , gξ22 ,
gz) = 1], where z is random.
5 We note that the DLIN distinguisher that ‘‘bridges’’ between Game 10 and Game 9 cannot directly decide whether (Z1, Z2, T ⋆1 , T
⋆
2 , T
⋆
3 ) forms a linear
tuple by generating a claim for the challenge signature σ ⋆ . The reason is that it does not know the exponent δ1 = logZ1 (T ⋆1 ), which prevents it from
computing a claim as per (9).
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5. Conclusion
This paper described the first efficient construction of traceable signature in the standard model. We additionally
extended the original model in order to offer support for abuse-free non-interactive claiming mechanisms.
Securely implementing all the functionalities of the primitive without appealing to the random oracle idealization raised
its deal of technical issues and we had to use several (non-standard) intractability assumptions to solve all the problems
encountered on the road. Itwould be interesting to see if TS systems can be evenmore efficiently obtainedwithout sacrificing
security guarantees in the standard model. Another open problem would be to extend the results of [10] and design multi-
group extensions of traceable signatures outside the random oracle heuristic.
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Appendix A. Security definition for digital signatures
A digital signature is a triple of algorithmsΣ = (Keygen, Sign,Verify) such that:
(i) On input of a security parameter λ ∈ N, Keygen(λ) outputs a key pair (usk, upk).
(ii) Sign is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes in a messageM and the private key usk. It outputs a signature σ .
(iii) Verify is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a messageM , a public key upk and a signature σ . It outputs 1 or
0 depending on whether σ is deemed valid or not.
The standard notion of security for digital signatures is the one given by Goldwasser et al. [31].
Definition 7 ([31]). A digital signature Σ is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks if, for any PPT
adversaryA in the game hereafter, we have Adveuf-sig(A) ∈ negl(λ).
1. The game begins with the challenger running (usk, upk)← Keygen(λ) and giving upk to the adversaryA.
2. A adaptively interacts with a signing oracle. Namely, at any time, A can ask for a signature on an arbitrary message M
and the challenger responds by computing σ ← Signusk(M) and returning σ toA.
3. A outputs a messageM⋆ and a signature σ ⋆. He wins ifM⋆ was never queried for signature and Verifyupk(M⋆, σ ⋆) = 1.
A’s advantage Adveuf-sig(A) is simply his probability of victory, taken over all coin tosses.
Appendix B. Groth’s key generation protocol
In [33], Groth described the following 5-move protocol that allows a prospective groupmemberU and a groupmanager
GM to jointly generate X = gx ∈ G in such a way that only the user gets to know the membership secret seci = x ∈ Z∗p and
the latter is further guaranteed to be uniformly distributed. The userU first generates ga. Both parties run a coin-flipping
protocol to generate a random value b+ c , that also serves as a challenge whenU proves knowledge of a, and the common
output finally consists of X = ga+b+c , whereas onlyU happens to know x = a+ b+ c .
1. U picks a, r $← Zp, η $← Z∗p and sends A = ga, R = g r , h = gη to GM.
2. GM picks b, s $← Zp and sends a commitment B = gb · hs toU.
3. U sends c $← Zp to GM.
4. GM opens the commitment B and sends the values b, s back toU.
5. U checks that B = gb · hs. If so,U sends z = (b+ c)a+ r mod p and η to GM and outputs x = a+ b+ c.
6. GM finally checks that η ∈ Z∗p , h = gη and Ab+c · R = gz . If so, GM outputs X = A · gb+c .
Under the discrete logarithm assumption in G, this protocol has black-box simulators that can emulate the view of a
malicious user or a malicious group manager. In the former case, the simulator has rewind access to the malicious user
and can force his private output to be a given value x ∈ Zp. In the latter case, the view of the malicious issuer can be
simulated to get his output to be a given X ∈ G. Moreover, the simulator does not need to know x = logg(X).
Appendix C. Details on the construction of proof elements
To construct proof elements, the signer starts from an assignment of π1, . . . , π8 that satisfies the verification equations,
which can be obtained as follows.
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π1 = (π⃗1,1, π⃗1,2, π⃗1,3)
=

ι(θ1)
r3 ⊙ g⃗12r1r3 ⊙ g⃗2s1r3+r1s3 ⊙ g⃗3t1r3+r1t3 ⊙ ι(Ω · θ3)r1 · ι(g)−r6 ,
ι(θ1)
s3 ⊙ g⃗1r1s3+r3s1 ⊙ g⃗22s1s3 ⊙ g⃗3t1s3+s1t3 · ι(Ω · θ3)s1 · ι(g)−s6 ,
ι(θ1)
t3 · g⃗1r1t3+r3t1 ⊙ g⃗2s1t3+s3t1 ⊙ g⃗32t1t3 ⊙ ι(Ω · θ3)t1 ⊙ ι(g)−t6

π2 = (π⃗2,1, π⃗2,2, π⃗2,3)
=

ι(Ω · θ3)r2 ⊙ g⃗12r2r3 ⊙ g⃗2r2s3+s2r3 ⊙ g⃗3r2t3+t2r3 ⊙ ι(θ2)r3 ,
ι(Ω · θ3)s2 ⊙ g⃗1r3s2+r2s3 ⊙ g⃗22s2s3 ⊙ g⃗3t3s2+t2s3 ⊙ ι(θ2)s3 ,
ι(Ω · θ3)t2 ⊙ g⃗1r3t2+r2t3 ⊙ g⃗2s3t2+s2t3 ⊙ g⃗32t2t3 ⊙ ι(θ2)t3

π3 = (π3,1, π3,2, π3,3)
= (g r4 · u−r30 · Gv(m)−r5 , g s4 · u−s30 · Gv(m)−s5 , g t4 · u−t30 · Gv(m)−t5)
π4 = (π4,1, π4,2, π4,3)
= (g r6 · h−r81 · h−r92 , g s6 · h−s81 · h−s92 , g t6 · h−t81 · h−t92 )
π5 = (π5,1, π5,2, π5,3)
= (g r7 · h−r83 · h−r94 , g s7 · h−s83 · h−s94 , g t7 · h−t83 · h−t94 )
π6 =

π⃗6,1, π⃗6,2, π⃗6,3

=

ϕ⃗r8δ1 ⊙ ι(X)r10 ⊙ g⃗1r8r10 ⊙ g⃗2s8r10 ⊙ g⃗3t8r10 , ϕ⃗s8δ1 ⊙ ι(X)s10 ⊙ g⃗1r8s10 ⊙ g⃗2s8s10 ⊙ g⃗3t8s10 , ϕ⃗t8δ1

π7 =

π⃗7,1, π⃗7,2, π⃗7,3

=

ϕ⃗r9δ2 ⊙ ι(X)r11 ⊙ g⃗1r9r11 ⊙ g⃗2s9r11 ⊙ g⃗3t9r11 , ϕ⃗s9δ2 ⊙ ι(X)s11 ⊙ g⃗1r9s11 ⊙ g⃗2s9s11 ⊙ g⃗3t9s11 , ϕ⃗t9δ2

π8 = (π8,1, π8,2) = (g r10+r11 , g s10+s11).
To obtain perfectly witness-indistinguishable proofs with a simulated common reference string, the signer needs to
randomize π1, π2, π6, π7 (i.e., that relate to quadratic pairing product equations) and make them uniform in the space of
proofs satisfying verification equations 1–2 and 6–7.
Appendix D. Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2
D.1. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is similar to the one of Lemma A.1 in [20]. The simulator B is given a HSDH instance consisting of (g,Ω =
gω, u) ∈ G3 and triples {Ai = g1/(ω+sIDi ), Bi = g sIDi , Ci = usIDi }i=1,...,ℓ, with ℓ = ℓa+ℓp, inG. Before preparing the simulation,
B makes a guess dmode
$← {0, 1} as to whetherAwill produce a Type I-A or Type I-B forgery.
Type I-A forgeries. In the expectation of a Type I-A forgery (dmode = 0), algorithm B picks ρu,1, ρ0, . . . , ρn $← Z∗p and sets
vi = gρi , for i = 0, . . . , n, and u1 = gρu,1 . It also defines u0 = u ∈ G and hi = gγi ∈ G for i = 0, . . . , 4 using randomly
drawn γ0, . . . , γ4
$← Z∗p . It finally chooses α1, α2 $← Z∗p , ξ1, ξ2 $← Zp, vector sets g = (g⃗1, g⃗2, g⃗3) and f = (f⃗ , f⃗1, f⃗2) so that
g⃗1 = (gα1 , 1, g), g⃗2 = (1, gα2 , g) and g⃗3 = g⃗1ξ1 · g⃗2ξ2 while f spans G3. It defines the group public key as
Y :=

g, {hi}i=0,...,4,Ω, u0, u1, {vi}i=0,...,n, g, f

.
Then,B starts interacting withA and initializes ctra, ctr ′a and ctrp to 0.
- Qa-join-queries: when A wants to introduce a malicious user in the group, he triggers an execution of the join protocol
with B acting as the issuer. Then, B increments ctr ′a, chooses x, y
$← Z∗p and simulates A’s view (using the black-box
simulation technique of Theorem 3 in [33]) in Step 1 of the protocol to make it end up with the public value X = gx (so
that the new user’s membership secret becomes x). Next, B uses (Actr , Bctr , Cctr), with ctr = ctr ′a + ctrp, and generates
a certificate (K1, K2, K3, K4) = (A(γ0+xγ1+yγ2)ctr , Actr , Bctr , Cctr). Parts K1, K2, K3 are sent to A along with y ∈ Z∗p . When A
responds with a signature on X ||K1||K2||K3||gy,B checks that the latter is valid. If so,B providesAwith the final part K4
of the membership certificate, increments ctra, adds the current value of N = ctra+ ctrp in Ua and stores (N, transcriptN)
in transcripts.
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- Qp-join-queries: whenA asksB to introduce a new honest user,B increments ctrp and proceeds in the same way as with
Qa-join-queries. The only difference is that it executes the join protocol in private and does not have the simulate the view
of amalicious user in the first step. As previously, it uses the ctrth triple (Actr , Bctr , Cctr), with ctr = ctr ′a+ctrp, of the HSDH
input to compute K1, . . . , K4. Also,B stores the indexN = ctra+ ctrp of the new user in Up and the entry (N, transcriptN)
in transcripts. The latter transcript is used to consistently answer subsequent signing queries that involve the new user.
- QY-queries: upon A’s request, B sends him the public key Y and the current number of users N = ctra + ctrp in the
group.
- Qsig-queries: to answer signing queries involving honest group members (in Up), B simply runs the signing algorithm
according its specification using the (known) membership certificate and the membership secret.
- Qreveal(i)-queries: at any time, A may also ask for the tracing trapdoor of any user i ∈ Up (he already knows those of
users in Ua). The simulator B can always answer such queries since it chose values (X = gx, y) itself when answering
the matching Qp-join query.
When the adversary A outputs a Type I forgery σ ⋆ = (T ⋆1 , T ⋆2 , T ⋆3 , σ⃗1⋆, . . . , σ⃗11⋆, π ⋆1 , . . . , π ⋆8 ) for some message M⋆,
algorithm B computes m⋆ = m1 . . .mn = H(M⋆||T ⋆1 ||T ⋆2 ||T ⋆3 ). It uses α1, α2 to compute a BBS decryption θ ⋆i = σi,3⋆ ·
σ ⋆i,1
−1/α1 ·σ ⋆i,2−1/α2 , where σ⃗i⋆ = (σ ⋆i,1, σ ⋆i,2, σ ⋆3,i), for i = 1, . . . , 9. The perfect soundness of the proof system guarantees that
θ ⋆2 = g
1
ω+sID⋆ , θ ⋆3 = g sID⋆ , θ ⋆4 = usID⋆ · uxδ11 ·

v0 ·
n∏
j=1
v
mj
j
rs
,
θ ⋆5 = g rs , T ⋆1 = gxδ1
for some sID⋆ ∈ Z∗p (that differs from values sID1 , . . . , sIDℓ with overwhelming probability6) and rs, x, δ1 ∈ Z∗p . Then, B can
extract a HSDH solution as
(g1/(ω+sID⋆ ), g sID⋆ , usID⋆ ) =

θ ⋆2 , θ
⋆
3 , θ
⋆
4/(T
⋆
1
ρu,1 · θ ⋆5 ρ0+
∑n
j=1 ρjmj)

.
Type I-B forgeries. We now consider the case of a Type I-B forgery. When dmode = 1, B initially picks a random i⋆ $←
{1, . . . , ℓa}. The group public keyY is generated in the sameway. The differencewith the case dmode = 1 lies in the treatment
of Qa-join queries: at the i⋆th such query (when ctr ′a ≠ i⋆,B behaves as when dmode = 0),B conducts the first step as in the
case dmode = 0 but the second step is run in a different way. It constructs (K1, K2, K3) by picking t $← Z∗p , and defining
K1 = g
γ0+xγ1+yγ2
t K2 = g1/t K3 = g t ·Ω−1.
This implicitly defines sID ∈ Z∗p to be t − ω. If A, acting as the malicious user, does not fail to respond as specified by the
final step of the protocol,B aborts. Otherwise, the simulation continues. IfA eventually outputs a forgery for which the BBS
decryption of σ⃗3
⋆ is K3 = g t ·Ω−1 (which occurs with probability 1/ℓa in a Type I-B forgery), the BBS decryption θ ⋆4 of σ⃗4⋆
must be ut−ω · uxδ11 · Gv(m)r . Along with T ⋆1 = gxδ1 , ρu,1 = logg(u1) and the decryption g r of σ⃗5⋆, θ ⋆4 must provideB with a
new ℓ-HSDH triple (g1/t , g t−ω, ut−ω).
To conclude the proof, the actual kind of Type I forgery will match the value of dmode with probability 1/2 since dmode is
independent ofA’s view. 
D.2. Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is based on Lemma A.2 in the security proof of the Boyen–Waters group signature [20]. As in the latter, the
simulator B receives as input a ℓa-HSDH instance comprising elements (g,Ω = gω, u) ∈ G3 as well as a set of triples
{Ai = g1/(ω+sIDi ), Bi = g sIDi , Ci = usIDi }i=1,...,ℓa .
To prepare the public key Y, it picks a random k $← {0, . . . , n}, exponents ρu,1, ρ0, . . . , ρn $← Z∗p and integers
β0, . . . , βn
$← {0, . . . , 2ℓs − 1}. It sets v0 = uβ0−2kℓs · gρ0 , vi = uβi · gρi for i = 1, . . . , n and u1 = gρu,1 . It also defines
u0 = u ∈ G and hi = gγi ∈ G for i = 0, . . . , 4 using random γ0, . . . , γ4 $← Z∗p and finally chooses vector sets g, f as specified
by the setup algorithm.
Before starting its interaction with the Type II forgerA, B initializes counters ctra, ctr ′a and ctrp to 0. These will account
for the number of users in Ua, the number of Qa-join-queries so far, and the number of users in Up, respectively.
- Qa-join-queries: adversarial-join queries are handled as in the proof of Lemma 1. Namely, B increments ctr ′a, chooses
random values x, y $← Z∗p and simulates A’s view in the first step of the protocol so as to force the new user’s
membership secret to become x. To generateA’s membership certificate,B uses the next unused triple (Actr ′a , Bctr ′a , Cctr ′a)
6 With negligible probability smaller than ℓ/p, it may happen that sID⋆ collides with some sIDi thatB did not use.
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to produce K1, K2, K3, K4. If the join protocol successfully terminates,B increments ctra, stores a record (N, transcriptN),
with N = ctra + ctrp, containing the interaction transcript in transcripts and adds index N in the set Ua.
- Qp-join-queries: when a new honest user is requested to privately join the system,B increments both ctr and ctrp and sets
N = ctra + ctrp. Then,B chooses x, y $← Z∗p . It also randomly selects tN $← Z∗p and calculates
K1 = g(γ0+xγ1+yγ2)/tN , K2 = g1/tN ,
K3 = g tN ·Ω−1, K4 = ⋆,
where ⋆ is a placeholder for an unknown group element. This implicitly defines the exponent sID = logg(K3) to be tN−ω.
The value N is added to Up while (K1, K2, K3, K4, y) is stored as part of transcriptsN. In the expectation of future signing
queries involving the user,B retains secN = x and tN.
- QY and Qreveal(i)-queries: are treated as in the proof of Lemma 1 and the simulator always knows the values requested
byA.
- Qsig-queries: whenA requests user i ∈ Up (with 1 ≤ i ≤ N) to sign messageM , our algorithmB first retrieves the tuple
(K1, K2, K3, K4, y) from transcripti and the previously stored seci = x and ti ∈ Z∗p . Since i ∈ Up, K4 = ⋆ is not available and
Bmust simulate knowing it. To do so, it begins by generating a triple (T1 = gxδ1 , T2 = gyδ2 , T3 = gδ1+δ2)which is hashed
along withM to obtainm = m1 . . .mn = H(M||T1||T2||T3). At this stage, write Gv(m) = v0 ·∏nj=1 vmjj as uJv(m) · gKv(m),
where Jv(m) = β0 − 2kℓs +∑nj=1 βjmj, Kv(m) = ρ0 +∑nj=1 ρjmj. If Jv(·) is zero in Z∗p ,B aborts. Otherwise, it can pick a
random rs
$← Z∗p and compute a pair
θ4 = uti · gx·δ1·ρu,1 ·Ω
Kv(m)
Jv(m) · Gv(m)rs , θ5 = g rs ·Ω
1
Jv(m)

,
which can be re-written as (θ4 = uti−ω ·ux·δ11 ·Gv(m)r˜s , θ5 = g r˜s) if one implicitly defines r˜s = rs+ω/Jv(m). This pair has
the required distribution and, together with (K1, K2, K3), allows one to generate an appropriately anonymized signature.
At the end of the game, the adversaryA outputs a messageM⋆ together with a Type II forgery
σ ⋆ = (T ⋆1 , T ⋆2 , T ⋆3 , σ⃗1⋆, . . . , σ⃗11⋆, π ⋆1 , . . . , π ⋆8 ).
By assumption, σ⃗3
⋆must be a BBS encryption of a valueK3 appearing in the transcript of someuser i⋆ ∈ Up. Then,B computes
the bitstring m⋆ = m1 . . .mn. As in the proof of Lemma 1, it performs BBS decryptions θ ⋆i = σi,3 · σ ⋆i,1−1/α1 · σ ⋆i,2−1/α2 for
i = 1, . . . , 9. By the perfect soundness of the proof system, these values must satisfy
θ ⋆2 = g1/(ω+sIDi⋆ ) θ ⋆3 = g sIDi⋆ θ ⋆4 = usIDi⋆ · uxδ11 · Gv(m⋆)rs
θ ⋆5 = g rs T ⋆1 = gxδ1 ,
for some rs, x, δ1 ∈ Z∗p , and where Gv(m⋆) = v0 ·
∏n
j=1 v
mj
j = uJv(m⋆) · gKv(m⋆) and sIDi⋆ = ti⋆ − ω. Then, the simulator B
aborts if Jv(m⋆) = β0 +∑nj=1 βjmj − 2kℓs ≠ 0. Otherwise,B can compute usIDi∗ = θ ⋆4/(θ ⋆5 Kv(m⋆) · T ⋆1 ρu,1), which yields a full
tuple

g1/(ω+sIDi⋆ ), g sIDi⋆ , usIDi⋆

such that the underlying sIDi⋆ = ti⋆ − ω differs from sID1 , . . . , sIDℓa with probability at least
1− ℓa/p (since the value ti⋆ was chosen at random when answering a Qp-join-query).
To assess B’s probability not to abort throughout the simulation, we can proceed as in [45,20]. Namely, one can show
that Jv(m) ≠ 0 in all signing querieswith probability≥ 1/2. Then, conditioned on the event thatB does not abort before the
forgery stage, the probability to have Jv(m⋆) = 0 is then shown to be at least 1/(2nℓs) (see [45] for a detailed analysis). 
Appendix E. Proof of Lemma 5
For convenience, we use the same variant of the CDH problem as in the treatment of framing attacks of Type I-B (in the
proof of Lemma 4). Namely, if the adversary is able to claim a signature of the same equivalence class as one created by an
honest signer, we show how to compute gb/a given (A = ga, B = gb).
We also consider two kinds of Type II attacks: Type II-A attacks are those for which Step 6 is executed (which means
that the condition of Step 5 is not fulfilled) in the experiment of Definition 5 whereas, in Type II-B attacks, the experiment
returns 1 and halts at Step 5.
As in the proof of Lemma 4, the simulator has to guess whetherAwill be a Type II-A or a Type II-B attacker beforehand.
To this end, he flips a fair binary coin at the very beginning of the game and prepares the public key accordingly.
Type II-A attacks. Let us first consider Type II-A attacks and assume an adversary A for which Step 6 is reached in the
non-frameability experiment (the case of the experiment returning 1 at Step 5 will be easier to explain then). We outline a
simulatorB that usesA to solve a CDH instance (A = ga, B = gb). Namely,B prepares Y as in the proof of security against
Type I-B attacks. In particular, it knows discrete logarithms ω = logg(Ω), α1 = logg(g1), α2 = logg(g2), ρu,1 = logg(u1)
and γi = logg(hi) for i = 0 to 4.
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It also defines f = B and, as in previous lemmas, it randomly chooses a vector of group elements f = (f0, f1, . . . , fn) ∈ Gn
using the technique of [45] in such a way that, for anymc ∈ {0, 1}n, it holds that Gf (mc) = f J(mc ) · AK(mc ), for some integer-
valued functions J(.), K(.) such that J(.) is small in absolute value and cancels with probability O(1/(n+1) ·ℓc). Throughout
the game,B interacts withA as follows:
- QS and QY-queries: are handled as when dealing with Type I forgeries.
- Qb-join-queries: at the ith such query,B runs the join protocol and plays the role of the prospective honest groupmember.
It picks xi
$← Z∗p , sets Xi = Axi ∈ G and simulates A’s view in such a way that the public value becomes Xi (and the
underlying membership secret happens to be seci = axi). Other steps of the join protocol are conducted as previously.
- Qsig-queries: at the jth Qsig-query involving user i ∈ Ub, B retrieves the previously stored element Xi = Axi and
generates signature components (θ1, θ2, θ3) using the membership certificate (K1, K2, K3, K4, yi). It then randomly
chooses δ1,ij, µij
$← Z∗p and calculates θ4 = K4 · Xρu,1δ1,iji · Gv(m)rs , θ5 = g rs for a random rs $← Z∗p . It finally computes
traceability values (T1, T2, T3) as
T1 = X δ1,iji = Axiδ1,ij , T2 = Ayiµij , T3 = gδ1,ij · Aµij ,
which implicitly defines δ˜2,ij = aµij in such a way that T2 = gyi δ˜2,ij and T3 = gδ1,ij+δ˜2,ij . Signature components
(θ6, θ7) are computable as (X
γ1
i · hyi2 , Xγ3i · hyi2 ). Also, since B knows exponents α1, α2, ξ1, ξ2 ∈ Zp such that ϕ⃗ =
(gα1ξ1 , gα2ξ2 , gξ1+ξ2+1), it is able to compute the commitment to δ˜2,ij (i.e., σ⃗11 = ϕ⃗ ˜δ2,ij ⊙ g⃗1r11 ⊙ g⃗2s11 , using random
exponents r11, s11
$← Z∗p) and the proof element π7 (as described in Appendix C).
- Qclaim-queries: when user i ∈ Ub is required to claim a message-signature pair (M, σ ), where σ can be parsed as
(T1, T2, T3, σ⃗1, . . . , σ⃗11, π1, . . . , π8),B returns⊥ if i ∉ Ub or if user i did not previously create a message-signature pair
involving (M, T1, T2, T3). Otherwise,B recalls the value xi, yi ∈ Zp such that Xi = Axi and certi = (K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i, yi)
as well as the scalars δ1,ij, µij ∈R Zp that were used to define T1 = Axiδ1,ij , T2 = Ayiµij and T3 = gδ1,ij · Aµij . Then, B
computes mc = H(M||T1||T2||T3||upk[i]) ∈ {0, 1}n, where upk[i] is the previously defined long term key of user i, and
evaluates the functions J(mc) and K(mc) such that Gf (mc) = f J(mc ) · AK(mc ). If J(mc) = 0, B halts and reports failure.
Otherwise, the first part (Dx,1,Dx,2) of the claim can be obtained by choosing rx
$← Zp and computing
(Dx,1,Dx,2) =

Gf (mc)rx · g−xiK(mc )/J(mc ), T rx1 · g−δ1,ij/J(mc )

,
which iswell-distributed sincewe canwrite (Dx,1,Dx,2) = (f 1/(axi) ·Gf (mc)r˜x , T r˜x1 ) if we implicitly define r˜x = rx− 1axiJ(mc ) .
As for the second part (Dy,1,Dy,2) of the claim, B can compute it as specified by the claiming algorithm since it knows
yi ∈ Zp. The tuple (Dx,1,Dx,2,Dy,1,Dy,2) can then be signed using the private key usk[i] of user i.
The game ends with A outputting a message M⋆ and a triple (σ ⋆, τ ⋆, upk⋆) such that σ ⋆ opens or traces to i⋆ ∈ Ub,
Claim-Verify(M⋆, σ ⋆, τ ⋆, upk⋆,Y) = 1 and user i⋆ produced a message-signature pair (M⋆, σ ⋆) with the same traceability
values (T ⋆1 , T
⋆
2 , T
⋆
3 ). In addition, (M
⋆, σ ⋆)may have been claimed by the legitimate signer (holding a long term key upk[i⋆])
upon adversarial request. By assumption, the claim τ ⋆ = (D⋆x,1,D⋆x,2,D⋆y,1,D⋆y,2, csig⋆)must be valid and pertain to a public
key upk⋆ such that upk⋆ ≠ upk[i⋆].
At this stage,B computesm⋆c = H(M⋆||T ⋆1 ||T ⋆2 ||T ⋆3 ||upk⋆) ∈ {0, 1}n and evaluates the functions J(m⋆c) and K(m⋆c). It fails
if J(m⋆c) ≠ 0 or if it happens thatm⋆c = H(M ′||T ′1||T ′2||T ′3||upk′) for some (M ′, T ′1, T ′2, T ′3, upk′) ≠ (M⋆, T ⋆1 , T ⋆2 , T ⋆3 , upk⋆) that
was previously involved in Qclaim-query. Otherwise, since we have G(m⋆c) = AK(m⋆c ) and since τ ⋆ satisfies the verification test
of Eq. (7), it must hold that
e

D⋆x,1, A
xiδ1,ij
 · eD⋆y,1, Ayiµij
e

AK(m⋆c ),D⋆x,2 · D⋆y,2
 = e(B, gδ1,ij · Aµij). (E.1)
If we now re-arrange terms in the above equation, we find
e

A,D⋆x,1
xi · D⋆y,1yiµij/δ1,ij · (D⋆x,2 · D⋆y,2)−K(m
⋆
c )/δ1,ij · B−µij/δ1,ij = e(g, B),
which implies that
D⋆x,1
xi · D⋆y,1yiµij/δ1,ij · (D⋆x,2 · D⋆y,2)−K(m
⋆
c )/δ1,ij · B−µij/δ1,ij = gb/a
is computable byB. If the hash functionH is collision-resistant, a sufficient condition for gb/a to be computable is to have
J(mc) ≠ 0 in each Qclaim-query and J(m⋆c) = 0 in the adversary’s output (M⋆, σ ⋆, τ ⋆). As in previous lemmas, known results
[37,45] on ‘‘programmable’’ hash functions tell us that this condition is satisfied with probability O(1/4nℓc).
Type II-B attacks. We are left with the case of Type II-B attacks where the experiment of Definition 5 returns 1 at Step 5
and does not reach Step 6. In such a situation, the adversary breaks either the security (i.e., the existential unforgeability
under chosen-message attack) of the ordinary signature scheme used by groupmembers or the Diffie–Hellman assumption.
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Namely, when the adversary outputs (M⋆, σ ⋆, τ ⋆), where σ ⋆ contains (T ⋆1 , T
⋆
2 , T
⋆
3 ) and with τ
⋆ = (D⋆x,1,D⋆x,2,D⋆y,1,D⋆y,2), two
situations can be distinguished.
- The simulatorB did not sign the tuple (D⋆x,1,D
⋆
x,2,D
⋆
y,1,D
⋆
y,2) using member i’s signing key usk[i]when answering Qclaim-
queries. In this case,A is necessarily able to break the unforgeability of the ordinary signature scheme (we omit the proof
which is straightforward).
- B signed the same tuple (D⋆x,1,D
⋆
x,2,D
⋆
y,1,D
⋆
y,2) when answering a Qclaim-query for another signature involving a tuple
(M, T1, T2, T3) ≠ (M⋆, T ⋆1 , T ⋆2 , T ⋆3 ). In this case, B can either find a collision for H or solve a Diffie–Hellman instance
(A = ga, B = gb) by proceeding exactly as in the case where the experiment reaches Step 6. To this end,B can prepare
the public key Y exactly in the same way and obtain gb/a with the same probability O(1/4nℓc). 
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